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Point out the "Way"—however dimly,
and lost among the host—as does the evening
star to those who tread their path in darkness.
—*The Voice of the Silence.*

THE ARYAN PATH

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OUR SIXTH VOLUME

With this issue THE ARYAN PATH enters upon its sixth year. Its fundamental purpose is to advocate the practice of the Noble Life; therefore its appeal is principally to the individual. Nobility consists in a special attitude of mind to the whole of life. Not by birth in any particular family is a man created noble, nor by reason of any outer possession does he attain nobility. All over the world, however, rank, title and worldly possessions, inherited by birth or acquired by efforts, are valued highly, while innate culture counts for little. Birth in a royal family makes even a boor a prince; wealth accumulated even by sharp practice too often raises its possessor to a high place in society. The *Bhagavad-Gita* describes this general phenomenon as typical of the Iron Age, in which "confusion of castes" prevails.

Nor is it noble meekly to follow a political leader, without

knowledge and without discernment. The intelligent everywhere scorn as *ignoble* the blind acceptance of priestly dicta; large numbers have broken that religious fetter forged by the exploiting priest many centuries ago at the time that the ancient and venerable institution of the Guru was destroyed, but failing to seek and find reality these masses are fast encumbering themselves with as ignoble a substitute.

Nor is nobility the complete disregard of Nature and Nature's Laws, in a kind of Bohemian spirit; neither is it to be found in the name of personal freedom, nor in the pursuit of happiness. It is equally clear that nobility does not consist in a mechanical maintenance of the traditions of any house or order.

"Manners not idle, but the fruit
Of loyal nature and of noble mind,"
when robbed of that soul

often become mere gesticulations, however spectacular, or even, perhaps productive of good. The studied manner—what is said, not what is felt or a display of deeds irrespective of motives and thoughts—is often a breeder of hypocrisy, a social vice almost universal. Polished manners often hide a mean or an obtuse soul. The cowl does not make the monk, nor the polished manner a gentleman. Was Jesus a gentleman when he cast out of the temple the money-changers, or when he cursed the barren fig tree? When was Gautama more noble?—when, as prince, he lived in the palace in the happy company of his queen; or when, as sage, he laboured with begging-bowl in hand, followed by his Bhikkhus?

These fictions disposed of, what constitutes Nobility? The same *Bhagavad-Gita*, offers a philosophy of life which would lift the human race into a state of true nobility. Its philosophy may be said to revolve round the word *Sva-dharma*. This is an almost untranslatable term in which numerous ideas are implicit: self-rule, soul-expression, observance of one's own inner religion, performance of one's own duty, obedience to the guidance of one's own inner spiritual being—and

there are other implications also. But in every connotation there is the root-idea of nobility. The base metal in men and women of all lands and all creeds can be transmuted into nobility, as iron and lead into gold. *Sva-dharma* and *Arya-dharma*, religion of the soul and religion of nobility, are synonymous ideas. They present a more exhaustive view of nobility than even the telling phrase, *noblesse oblige*. The latter emphasises the outer aspect of the manner and behaviour of the noble towards others, but does not bring out the concept of inner discipline, the rule of the Self over the self, of soul over mind, of spirit over matter.

The Noble Man is the Superior Man; his mind freed from passions breathes peace, lighted by knowledge radiates sympathy, and made liberal by philosophy spreads good-will. Though poor in possessions he is rich in sacrifices and inspires in others his own courage to face life, his own capacity to fight its obstacles and his own perseverance to attain success.

THE ARYAN PATH puts forward month by month articles which it earnestly hopes will modify and adjust the mind of the reader, thus preparing it for the revolution through which it must pass ere it emerges robed in sacred Nobility.

THE PROPONENT OF UNIVERSAL RELIGION

[In these days when Dictators are rising, one after another, on the political horizon and the very existence of Democracy is seriously threatened, the following article on Asoka, to be published in two parts, will have an illuminating message. Asoka went to the root of the difficulty which is religion. He formulated a Universal Religion based on moral principles, thereby aiming to achieve the Brotherhood of Man. That he succeeded to a very great measure is mainly due to his method—he did not allow the individual to be swamped by the mass of humanity while legislating for the latter. He also succeeded in abolishing war during his reign, not by forced reduction of armaments, but by orientating the national mind into higher values of Truth, Non-Violence, and Spiritual Harmony.

Radhakumud Mookerji is famous for his deep scholarship and original research. He is the author of several volumes on ancient Hindu culture and has also written authentic biographies of two great ancient Hindu rulers, Asoka and Harsha. In this article Professor Mookerji sets out in outline the golden career of Asoka and shows how he achieved what our boastful age is hoping for.—EDS.]

Asoka may be regarded as India's greatest king. According to H. G. Wells, he is the world's greatest king. The claim to greatness of this Indian ruler of the third century B. C. rests not alone upon his unique administrative genius, but also on his efforts in behalf of a universal religion which would reconcile credal antagonisms and supply a self-compelling basis for right ethics. Coupled with the network of public works of utility which he spread over the whole country to promote the physical well-being of his people, he vigorously prosecuted measures for their spiritual well-being by means of mass-instruction in Dharma or Religion—not any particular religion professed by any sect or community, but Religion which is common and acceptable to all sects and communities as the universal religion of mankind. His position as emperor who had to deal with so many creeds and sects no doubt presented

special problems. The usual policy in such cases is that of strict religious neutrality. But Asoka, on his own principles, could not remain neutral or indifferent in regard to what he believed to be the supreme duty of a king, *viz.*, to achieve the moral progress of his people. Therefore, he was driven, by the necessities of his case, to evolve a religion for purposes of mass instruction which should be above creed, and universally acceptable as the elements (*sāra*) [Rock Edict XII] common to all religions. Asoka thus stands out as a pioneer of universal religion.

The religion that he thus invented for the masses and which was adopted for purposes of state religious instruction consisted of the cardinal principles of morality upon which all can agree, irrespective of caste or creed. It comprised "obedience to father and mother, elders, teachers, seniors in age or standing; respect

for teachers; proper treatment towards relations, servants and dependants, the poor and the needy, towards friends, acquaintances, and companions; gifts to ascetics, friends, comrades and relatives, and to the aged; abstention from slaughter of living beings even for religious purposes; complete non-violence towards all life; and cultivation of specified virtues such as "*Dayā* (kindness), *Dānam* (charity), *Satyam* (truthfulness), *Saucha* (outer and inner purity), *Mārdavam* (mildness of temper), *Sādhutā* (goodness), *Bhāva-śuddhi* (purity of heart), *Parīkshā* (self-examination), *Bhaya* (fear of sin), *Utsāha* or *Parākrama* (self-exertion in moral life).*

BASIS LAID IN PURITY OF DOMESTIC LIFE

The idea that is at the root of Asoka's moral scheme is that morality or religion, like charity, must begin at home and be in full evidence primarily in the sphere of a person's domestic life, of his personal and intimate relations, in the inner circle of his daily associates, not excluding even the dumb, domesticated animals which are part of a Hindu's household. In all these spheres, a person must first qualify for the moral life by the cultivation of proper relations as his habit or second nature, and not by any artificial, assumed or forced "rationalisation," so that his whole life, from day to day, in every moment, may be governed by a spirit of innate good-will, justice and an abounding charity that flows out even to servants and the

domestic animals. Asoka thus believed in the purity and perfection of the home as the unit of society. The level of social life depends on that attained in the domestic life in a community.

HIS FOREIGN MISSIONS OF SOCIAL SERVICE

Such a cosmopolitan scheme of morality or religion Asoka could conscientiously and freely propagate among all communities all over the country, and even beyond. He went so far as to organise foreign missions to propagate this new religion in certain Western countries, which are mentioned by him, where his work was already making progress, as stated by him. He says:—

This Dharma-Vijaya or "moral" conquest has been repeatedly won by him both in his dominions, and even among all the frontier peoples up to a limit of 600 *yojanas*, embracing the territories of five Greek Kings, Antiochos [II Theos of Syria, who ruled between 261-296 B.C.], Ptolemy [Ptolemy II Philadelphos of Egypt, 285-247 B.C.], Antigonos [of Macedonia, 278-239 B.C.], Magas [of Cyrene, 300-258 B.C.] and Alexander [of Epirus, 272?-258 B.C.]; and, towards the south, among the Cholas, Pāṇḍyas, as far as Tāmraparni (Ceylon)...Everywhere are people following the moral injunctions of His Sacred Majesty [Rock Edict XIII].

ASOKA'S TREATMENT OF COMMUNAL PROBLEMS

Asoka's greatness is further brought out in the way he treated the communal problems of his time, which are the eternal problems of India. He has published a special proclamation on the subject [Rock Edict XII] in words which have

value even in present times. The religious toleration that he preaches in this Edict was the logical consequence, the natural extension, of his general religious views, on the basis of which he had established his State Religion for adoption by all communities and classes in the country. The Inscription states:—

His Sacred and Gracious Majesty the King shows honour to all sects, and to all classes, ascetics as well as householders; by gifts and offerings of various kinds is he honouring them. But His Sacred Majesty does not value such gifts or honours as that how there should be the growth of the essential elements (*sāra-vṛiddhi*) of all religions. The growth of this "essence" of all religions is of diverse kinds. But the root of it (*mūlām*) is restraint of speech (*vachā-guṇṭi*), that is, that there should not be thoughtless praise of one's own sect and criticism of others' sects. Such belittling or slighting (*lahukā*) as well as appreciation must be on proper specified grounds. Thus doing, one helps his own sect to grow and benefits the sects of others too. Doing otherwise, one inflicts injury on his own sect and does disservice to the sects of others. For whosoever extols his own sect and condemns the sects of others wholly from a blind devotion to his own sect, *i.e.*, from the thought, "How I may glorify (*dīpayāma*) my own sect,"—one acting thus injures all the more the interests of his own sect. Therefore, it is very desirable that the followers of different sects should be brought together in concord (*samavāya*) that they might know of the doctrines held by others. The King, in fact, desires that all sects should be possessed of wide learning (*bahu-śruta*) and doctrines productive of real good. And to all those who are contentedly established in their respective faiths, the King's message is that he does not so much value the bestowal on them of his many gifts and

other forms of external honour, as that there should be achieved the growth of the "essentials" of all religions and a consequent "breadth" of outlook.

These words show how far ahead of his times was Asoka in his religious ideas. As the apostle of Peace, he naturally tried to find its true basis in religion which he tried to purge of elements that would make for differences. Religion is at once the friend and the enemy of peace. In one of his Edicts [Minor Rock Edict I], he states how "the people of Jambudvīpa, *i.e.*, India, were disunited, along with their gods," pointing to the strife of gods and their worshippers, the battle of creeds and sects. The various hints and suggestions thrown out by Asoka in the Inscription under notice, if analysed, will form themselves into the following scheme for achieving communal harmony:—

(1) There is a core or kernel of truth in every religion, a body of essential doctrines on which all religions agree and which must be separated from their non-essential elements. A recognition of the unity of all religions in their central truths is the foundation of religious harmony.

(2) A respect for the common truths of all religions should naturally lead to "restraint of speech" (*vachā-guṇṭi*) in dealing with the doctrines of different religions. This does not shut out the freedom of religious discussions which characterised the religious life of ancient India as evidenced, for instance, in the Upanishads. Only, the discussion must not be thoughtless or

* See p. 69 of my *Asoka*, Gaekwad Lectures (Macmillan, London) for full references.

malicious, but should be inspired by a genuine thirst for knowledge.

(3) Discussions should be organised in regular religious conferences (called *samavāya*) where the followers of different sects should expound their respective doctrines, which they must learn to appreciate.

(4) Sectarianism will be conquered by a width of learning by which the follower of each sect will acquaint himself with the doctrines of others' sects and become a *Bāhu-Śruta*, i. e., a master of many Śrutis, of the scriptures of different religions. Sectarianism is produced where a sect confines its studies exclusively to its own scriptures, and cultivates ignorance of the scriptures of other sects. This ignorance is the fruitful source of religious intolerance and sectarian strife. The best antidote to religious fanaticism is a comparative study of different religions—in which Asoka was a pioneer and far in advance of his age.

(5) Lastly, out of this "breadth of knowledge" will naturally spring a "breadth" of outlook, a wide-hearted charity and toleration, a spirit of catholicity and cosmopolitanism (*bahukā*), which alone can solve the problem of communalism in this country.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROMOTION OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION

As usual with him, Asoka makes proper administrative arrangements for the systematic execution of his policy of promoting religious

toleration in the country by means of the measures adumbrated above. This work was entrusted by him to his Ministry of Morals and other suitable bodies of officials, especially those appointed to work among the women (*Stri-Adhyaksha-Dharma-Mahāmātras*) notorious for their religious narrowness and bigotry, and among the masses, especially the way-farers and pilgrims, dealt with by officers called *Vraja-bhūmikas*, lit., "those in charge of the pastures," including highways and rest-houses and other works of public utility executed by Asoka.*

ASOKA'S IDEA OF TRUE CEREMONY

Another point of Asoka's greatness may be found in the doctrine of True Ceremonial which he preaches in one of his Edicts [Rock Edict IX]. Here also Asoka shows himself to be ahead of his age as a thinker and religious leader by distinguishing the essentials of religion from its envelope of formalism, customs and ceremonies which are not of the substance (*sāra*) of religion. He found his people, and especially the women-folk, given too much to rituals, to the performance of "too many, manifold, trivial and worthless ceremonies" connected with ordinary events of life, like illness, marriage, birth, or even a journey, as if mere ceremonies made up religion and a pious life. The undue emphasis laid on ceremonies is still the bane of Hinduism. Asoka shows great freedom of thought and spiritual insight in calling his

ritual-ridden people to the true moral life and performance of the "True Ceremonial" (*Dharma-Mangalam*) which consisted only in inner purity, in character, in good and moral conduct in all relations of life, and not in some external formal acts.

HIS PUBLICITY METHOD: ROCK AND PILLAR INSCRIPTIONS

A word may be said in conclusion as to the method of publicity adopted by Asoka in preaching his new religion to the masses in different and distant parts of his vast empire in those pre-mechanical ages which had none of the modern facilities of communication. His first step was to have his words so written "that they may last for all time" [*chira thitika-hotu* in Rock Edict V], just as the pious Job had wished: "O that my words were now written! That they were graven with an iron pen and lead in the rock for ever!" But Asoka had Job's yearning fulfilled to the letter. He did have literally an iron pen with which his scribes [*lipikaras* in Minor Rock Edict II, and also in Rock Edict XIV] inscribed his words on stone as imperishable material. Rocks were chosen at suitable sites to bear these inscriptions, sites that were most populous or frequented, cities or centres of pilgrimage where these "sermons in stone" would be read by the crowds coming there. But sometimes rock and accessibility did not go together. The rocks might be out of the way. Then these were artificially produced to bear the emperor's messages. They were in the shape of huge mono-

lithic pillars of monstrous proportions tapering in form up to a height of fifty feet and weighing about fifty tons. These pillars were produced after a common design, in workshops situated among the modern Chunar hills, the quarries of which supply to this day the particular reddish sandstone used by Asoka as the material of his Pillars. As Asoka himself states:—

This message of morality must be engraved on pillars or slabs of stone so that it may thereby last for ever [Pillar Edict VII].

So far, his Rock-Inscriptions have been discovered in fourteen different places distributed all over India in North, West, East and South, and the Pillar-Inscriptions in ten other places. Two of the Rock-Inscriptions are in the North-West Frontier Province (at Shahbazgarhi and Mansehra), one at Kalsi in Dehra Dun, a fourth at Girnar in Kathiawad, another at Sopara in Bombay Presidency, another at Dhauili in Orissa and a few others in the Deccan and in Mysore. The Pillar Inscriptions are at Delhi, Allahabad, Sanchi, Sarnath, and a few other places in Bihar and Nepal tarai. Thus these nearly forty Inscriptions on stone and pillar were distributed throughout India, marking not merely the limits of Asoka's extensive empire, but also its chief centres of population and culture by which flowed the main currents of public life and civilisation in those days. These centres of civilisation of India under Asoka changed in later times, as the course of civilisation

* For this and other points, see my *Asoka*.

changed and flowed along new routes.

WAS THERE A *LINGUA FRANCA* IN INDIA UNDER ASOKA?

Another noteworthy feature of these Inscriptions was that they must have been read by the masses in those days, which, according to the renowned historian, Vincent A. Smith, should indicate the extent of literacy then achieved in the country. They are written in the same script (Brāhmī) all over India, except in the North-West Province, where the local script Kharoshthī is used, and they are also written in the same language, with verbal variations corresponding to those of local dialects. This variety in script and dialect is another proof showing that the inscriptions must have been read by the masses and that, what is more striking, the language in which they were composed must have been the *lingua franca* of India in those days. This raises questions of great importance in the history of Indian languages, Sanskrit and the Prakrits, whether Sanskrit was the language of culture and religion and the Prakrit, as illustrated in Asoka's Inscriptions, was the language of the market-place, of business and secular life, and of the masses. But these linguistic problems are beyond the scope of this paper.

A COMPARATIVE ESTIMATE.

Let me now conclude with a short comparative estimate of Asoka's greatness among kings by citing the following words from my work on Asoka:—

In the annals of kingship, there is scarcely any record comparable to that of Asoka, both as a man and as a ruler. To bring out the chief features of his greatness, historians have instituted comparisons between him and other distinguished monarchs in history, eastern and western, ancient and modern, pagan, Moslem and Christian. In his efforts to establish a Kingdom of righteousness after the highest ideals of a theocracy, he has been likened to David and Solomon of Israel in the days of its greatest glory; in his patronage of Buddhism, which helped to transform a local into a world religion, he has been compared to Constantine in relation to Christianity; in his philosophy and piety he recalls Marcus Aurelius; he was a Charlemagne in the extent of his empire and, to some extent, in the methods of his administration, too, while his Edicts, "rugged, uncouth, involved, full of repetitions" read like the speeches of Oliver Cromwell in their mannerisms [Rhys Davids]. Lastly, he has been compared to Khalif Omar and Emperor Akbar, whom also he resembles in certain respects.

The fact is that there was in Asoka a combination of all that was great and good in other kings, which justifies H. G. Wells's judgment that he was the world's greatest king.

RADHAKUMUD MOOKERJI

THE CONCEPT OF MATTER: ITS DEVELOPMENT

[J. W. N. Sullivan has gained a great reputation as an expounder of modern scientific theories and views. His latest activity is issuing, in collaboration with Walter Grierson, a publication in twenty-four parts entitled "Outlines of Modern Belief". In the first part, the following remarks appear:—

One can say that the old strictly mechanical view of the universe, which was so widely held in the Victorian era, is now dead. (p. 3)

The "stuff" of the world is thus envisaged as immaterial entities instead of material things. (p. 7)

This article narrates the story of the great change since the death of the Victorian materialism; its closing sentence may be described as prophetic. Mind is no more the product of matter; mind is fast assuming its old-world position as the Primary of which matter is but an emanation.—Eds.]

The precise philosophical status of scientific entities is a subject which is still being discussed by philosophers. The old belief that the space, time, and matter of science are the "objective" realities that lie behind the appearances of the perceived world is now regarded, even by the scientific men themselves, as naïve. The relation between these entities and the world of our sense impressions is not to be described as the relation between Reality and Appearance. That there is some correspondence between scientific entities and reality is indisputable. Otherwise science could not be as successful as it is. But the scientific description is concerned only with certain aspects of the real, probably only with its formal, metrical aspects.

The inherent limitations of the scientific method of approach to "reality" is well illustrated by the development of the scientific conception of matter. At the time when Tyndall delivered his Belfast Address the scientific conception of matter differed from the ordinary view chiefly by attributing to

matter an atomic structure. Scientific analysis had discovered that a piece of matter is not really continuous; it is made up of a number of very small particles. These particles were *merely* small particles, that is to say, they were merely little bits of the familiar substantial stuff everybody knew as matter. There were several sorts of these atoms, corresponding to the various kinds of matter, gold, chlorine, mercury, etc. The chief difference between them is in their weights. An atom of oxygen, for example, is sixteen times heavier than an atom of hydrogen. It was surmised that they are probably little hard spheres, and on this assumption their dimensions were worked out.

Implicit in the whole of this analysis was the assumption that matter is an irreducible ultimate. The ordinary conception of matter as an enduring substance was fully supported by this analysis. The doctrine of materialism was neither helped nor hindered by it, for the atomic constitution of matter throws no light on the question of

its independent reality, and does nothing to make more plausible the idea that mind is a product of matter. The philosophic implications of the atomic theory, in this form are completely neutral.

During the 'nineties a brilliant series of experiments showed that this form of the atomic theory is insufficient. Small electrified particles, much smaller than the lightest known atom, the hydrogen atom, were discovered. These particles were found to be of two kinds, one being charged with negative electricity, and the other with positive electricity. They were called electrons and protons. It was immediately surmised that these are the foundation stones of the material universe, that out of these electrified particles all the atoms of matter are built.

Before this idea could be carried through, a radical change had to be made in our conception of matter. For experiment and calculation showed that electrons and protons are wholly electrical—they are disembodied charges of electricity. If, then, all atoms are built up out of these charges, matter must be wholly electrical in constitution. This idea seemed to rob matter of its substantiality, for electricity had been regarded as a "state," not as a substance. However, the mathematicians had shown that an electrically charged body possesses more inertia than does an uncharged body. If inertia can be attributed to an electric charge, then electricity loses some of its "immateriality". For we find that an essential ingredient

in the vague and ill-defined notion of substantiality is precisely this quality of inertia. Since electric charges possess it, they could conceivably play the role of matter. Nevertheless, the notion of matter had now become somewhat more abstract.

The nature of electricity was admittedly unknown. Unlike matter, it was not associated with a rich complex of familiar sense impressions. If matter is really nothing but electricity then our sense impressions, it was felt, are in some way illusory. The external something corresponding to these impressions is evidently very different from what it appears to be, just as light waves in the ether are very different from the colour red that we actually perceive. The electrical theory of matter did, to the general mind, create another gap between appearance and reality. A certain elusiveness now attached, it was realised, to what had formerly been regarded as the most fundamental of entities, namely, matter.

The next step for the scientific men was to find out how electrons and protons combined to form the different kinds of atoms. Lord Rutherford was the first to give a satisfactory model. His experiments indicated that each atom consists of a positive charge at its centre and a number of electrons circulating round it—the so-called "solar system" model. The strength of the positive charge, and the number of circulating electrons, varies for the different sorts of atoms, ranging from one

for hydrogen to ninety-two for uranium. This model had strong experimental support, but the mathematicians found, when they came to examine it, that such an atom could not exist. According to the accepted laws of electrodynamics such an atom would vanish, in a flash of radiation, in a minute fraction of a second. The accepted laws of nature made this theory of matter impossible.

Certain other phenomena were known, however, which were similarly inexplicable on the accepted laws of nature. Experiments on the heat radiated from a hot body, for instance, reached results which flatly contradicted calculation. At the beginning of the present century Max Planck put forward a theory of heat radiation which resolved this contradiction. He showed that the experimental results could be accounted for if we assume that heat is not radiated or absorbed in a continuous manner, but jerkily and disconnectedly—by discrete atoms of energy, in fact. This idea was so strange and revolutionary that it attracted comparatively little attention. But it occurred to the brilliant young Danish physicist, Niels Bohr, that this principle, in a modified form, might be applied to the theory of the atom. The manner in which he did this is curiously interesting. Of the laws of electrodynamics he kept such as suited him, and he replaced the others by laws of his own. There was no logical justification for this procedure. Its justification was that it worked. An atom con-

structed on these principles would persist instead of vanishing instantaneously, and its calculated behaviour agreed with certain striking experimental results which had never been accounted for before. Also, the arbitrary character of the new laws was considerably softened by the fact that they were related to the principle put forth by Planck. The Bohr atom was a great success, and was generally accepted by the scientific world. Thus the atom had changed from the small hard sphere of earlier theory to a complicated structure of electric particles obeying laws of an entirely novel character.

The laws governing radiation and atomic phenomena belong to that great branch of modern scientific knowledge called Quantum Theory. Relativity Theory and Quantum Theory, between them, cover practically the whole of modern physics. The first deals with large-scale phenomena, and the second with the phenomena we encounter when we deal with the ultimate constituents of the material universe. It appears that when we reach these ultimate constituents, atoms and electrons, we encounter an entirely different set of laws from those that govern the behaviour of matter in bulk. We may put the difference briefly by saying that the ordinary laws assume the continuity of natural processes, whereas the quantum laws assume discontinuity. The dominant characteristic of the world, from the point of view of quantum theory, is its atomicity.

Not only matter and electricity, but also energy, are atomic. The ordinary laws of nature are really only statistical laws. In any ordinary phenomenon an immense number of atoms, of matter or energy or both, are involved, and the individual behaviour of these separate atoms is, as it were, averaged out. Thus the quantum laws are the fundamental ones. It should be possible to deduce the laws governing large-scale phenomena from the laws governing individual atoms. The deduction cannot be effected the other way round.

By this time not only had the "matter" of the Victorians been dissolved away, but also their "iron laws" had been given an entirely different status. For the significant thing about the true fundamental laws, the quantum laws, was that they do not present nature as the rigidly determined scheme it had been supposed to be. These laws did not enable us to predict the future from a knowledge of the present. We know nowadays that this is not a temporary limitation. The modern Principle of Indeterminacy states that it is impossible in the nature of things for science to present the world as a rigidly determined whole. So far as scientific evidence goes we have no reason to believe that the behaviour of the ultimate constituents of the material universe is predestined.

For about ten years the conception of the atom developed by Bohr was found satisfactory. But as experimental results accumulated its inadequacy became more appar-

ent, until it became clear that the problem of matter could not be solved on Bohr's lines. It was at this time that De Broglie published his paper on the wave theory of matter. Here for the first time the "particle" conception of matter was attacked. De Broglie put forward the suggestion that matter has a dual constitution, that it has both wave and particle aspects. This notion of a dual constitution was not unprecedented. It had already been attributed to light. In certain experiments light behaves as if it consisted of a stream of corpuscles. In other experiments it just as indubitably behaves as a group of waves. At present we have just to accept this duality. We cannot synthesize these two aspects of light. We can form a compound word out of wave and particle—Eddington has suggested "wavicle"—but we cannot form a compound idea.

The new conception of matter, begun by De Broglie, brings with it similar difficulties. If a shower of electrons be allowed to fall on a specially prepared screen they produce flashes of light irregularly all over it. The electrons behave just as if they were a shower of little particles. If now we fire electrons through a very thin metal sheet on to a photographic plate they produce alternate bright and dark bands on the plate,—clear evidence that a system of waves has passed through the metal sheet.

To conceive an electron as both a wave and a particle is difficult enough, but our difficulties are in-

creased by a more thorough discussion. The mathematicians can represent an electron as a system of waves, but only if each electron is supposed to have a three-dimensional space to itself. It is clear that these waves are not physical waves. It is suggested that they are waves of probability, that when they are plentiful in a region it indicates that an electron is likely to be in that region. Their connection with the waves revealed by experiment is not clear. Matter is, indeed, one of the most mysterious entities known to science. Its scientific formulation, as we have seen, has become steadily more abstract. One familiar image after another has been given up until, at the present time, it is only in terms of mathematical symbols that this mysterious entity can be expressed at all.

We see that the whole development of the scientific conception of matter may be described as the passage from familiar images to the unimaginable. The nature of the reality we try to penetrate is, it would seem, something very alien to us. Our mental equipment, our

notions of space, time, causation, and so on, are quite inappropriate, it has been suggested, to the questions of modern science. The difficulties we experience arise from the way we think about things. The difficulties of modern physics are probably, at bottom, metaphysical difficulties. The new physics will rest on a new metaphysic. Attempts are being made to construct this metaphysic. Sir James Jeans, as we know, has been led to the conclusion that the whole material universe, including its space-time framework, is purely mental. By a somewhat different path, Sir Arthur Eddington has arrived at the belief that everything that exists is "mind-stuff". We need not agree with these points of view, as their authors have stated them, but certainly they are symptomatic. The chief importance of the new science, to the general mind, consists precisely in its new philosophical foundations. The old scientific philosophy which made mind derivative from matter is in process of being replaced by a philosophy that makes matter derivative from mind.

J. W. N. SULLIVAN

WESTERN PHILOSOPHY AND MYSTICISM

[Richard Rothschild is the author of *Paradoxy—The Destiny of Modern Thought* and of *Reality and Illusion*. The preceding article shows how modern science is reaching its fusion point with philosophy. This article speaks of the evolution of philosophy into mysticism.—EDS.]

At the risk of over-simplifying the problem by conceptualizing certain schools of thought dichotomously so that all ideas must fall into one group or the other, we may begin by conceiving of philosophy and mysticism as representing basic opposites.

On the one hand, philosophy represents the attempt to grasp reality through concepts clearly defined, and ultimately to arrive at a unity of things in this way. Thus logic, as the science of relations between limited entities, is clearly the tool of philosophy. Yet a logical process must always start from some point. Hence, although logic (deductive logic) may develop truth, it is not what can fairly be called "new" truth. The process of multiplying one particular 50-digit number by another 50-digit number may yield a number which no individual man has ever considered before. This number, however, was implicit all the while in the decimal number series set up in the first place. In this way all the conclusions of logic may be said to be tautological, in that they are from the start implicit in the definitions (or meaning content) of the premises. Only the premises themselves may be conceived as representing "new" truth, and even these may of course be the conclusions of previous syllogisms

in an indefinite regress back to the original premises from which the process at some point or other starts, and which represent irrational faiths. If there is any certainty in the conclusions of logic, it is merely because they are analytical in nature. Truly synthetic conclusions always have a germ of doubt, though logic may later come along and, by re-defining terms, secure an appearance of absolutism, as in inductive science where an investigator's hypothesis may be confirmed by sufficient selected data so that it assumes the aspect of a theory, and then, by a re-definition of terms through which exceptional cases are accounted for or eliminated, the theory becomes a mathematical law. Certainty is therefore always achieved at the price of substance. Conclusions which are of real consequence, that is, which represent new insights, are not certain.

This is not to deny the value of logic as a means of clarifying one's position and of avoiding muddy thinking; but it would seem that an obscurantism is involved when one puts too great a faith in the reasoning process itself. It may be that all knowledge must be put in the form of logic, if only in order to secure a greater integration of it and to avoid contradictions within any one structure; but this is not

to say that the structure as a whole does not have an irrational basis and that therefore, presumably, other equally valid structures could be built from different premises. A proposition may be derived either deductively (that is, by rationally developing it as an implication of premises), or inductively (that is, through a wilful act whereby vaguely perceived elements are galvanized into an intelligible, unified and clear-cut judgment). In both cases, however, it is the will which "sees" things as definable in such a way as to make certain conclusions logically necessary. On the one hand, deductive propositions are determined by the way in which the will sets up or synthesizes the premises. On the other hand, the will is itself limited, in the synthetic activity of setting up these premises, by the rationally developed deductions previously reached and accepted; in other words, it must set up such premises as may logically serve as the bases of the already recognized world of realities. In both cases the premises represent elements which are grasped intuitively, that is, through mystic insights.

And this brings us to the subject of mysticism. If philosophy represents the attempt to reach reality through the logical relating of concepts, mysticism may be said to represent the attempt to reach reality through direct experience. And because experience involves particulars (however much it may be said to depend on prior concepts in terms of which alone particular experiences are possible), mysticism

is concerned with the unique rather than with the general. This uniqueness of a thing, says the mystic, is something, which eludes all attempts at definition, since to define it would be to apply general terms in its description, and there is always something, over and beyond any adjectives we may ascribe, which we feel constitutes the inner essence or "thereness" of the thing itself. Accordingly the mystic, in his attempt to reach and "know" what he calls ultimate reality, justifies his antagonism to thought processes as such. For if to be conscious of a thing is to classify it with other things, then the only perception of "naked" reality can come in a state of unconsciousness (or superconsciousness) in which the processes of intellect are in abeyance. Hence the mystic arrives at the conclusion that the attitude of wonder should be the attitude of the seer, as in the fairy tale in which a wolf is not merely an animal classifiable with other animals, but a particular animal embodying a witch or goblin, and in which a bird is not merely a sparrow, but the outward aspect of a bewitched princess. It is the magic in them which distinguishes them from all other beings and makes them unique.

In the West, with its activity, its faith in conceptualized knowledge and the worth-whileness of conduct towards specific ends, the mystic attitude has been almost incomprehensible. The Western mind has even tried to conceptualize the mystic experience, to describe it and think about it. Thus there are

those who take seriously experiments purporting to show that "the experience of the mystic could be produced by nitrous oxide anaesthesia," a remark which would be ludicrous were it not so obtuse. For, pursuing this same line of inquiry, one might well find that the scientific attitude of mind itself might be developed in one by some new brand of laughing gas, or that a dose of salts might make one think that two and two were five. Yet, as we have found, Western man, in the very definition of his world, must logically admit his dependence on mystic insights. Every object, generalization or law of nature which he recognizes is the result of a process of synthesis which in itself cannot be described but must constitute an ultimate mystery. Herein, in fact, lies the problem of the reliance of philosophy on words as symbols for concepts—words which are necessarily so encrusted with the connotations of particular insights that it is difficult for the reader to break through to the restricted meanings which they are conceived as having for the writer. Even so-called "clear" definitions fall short in this respect (as witness the various "interpretations" of philosophical conclusions).

Historically, philosophy has concerned itself with much that has not been properly within its sphere. For, in an age which lacked specialization, philosophy pre-empted all fields of knowledge, art, politics and religion. To-day, however, when much of this subject matter has been relegated to

specialists, philosophy can devote itself to its most important work—the synoptic view of the whole. It is of course true that even the specialist must have some such perspective, some sense of values to apply to his data, if he is to arrive at generalizations possessing validity. It remains for philosophy, however, to devote itself specifically to achieving this organic view of things, and accordingly even philosophy must lead eventually to mysticism. Only the ultimate unity may be conceived as possessing full reality. All else is merely approximately, tentatively or hypothetically real, a mere "as if" of experience.

Thus, although realism (as the implied philosophy of Western science) and mysticism appear to be diametrically opposite in every respect, closer analysis reveals a surprising similarity, seldom pointed out, in their respective points of view. Realism assumes that it is possible, through carefully guarded scientific procedures, to discover relationships in a world which is real in the sense of being entirely distinct from all thinking about it. Modern science is therefore Platonic in its insistence that the external world is characterized by universals or Forms independent of human will, and yet that it is possible for science, not perhaps to grasp these ultimate Forms, relations or universals in their purity or absoluteness, but at least to set up mathematical formulae and laws which "approximate" the eternal. Scientific realism thus posits a world of absolutes which

are conceived as the potential elements which, in ordinary experience, come to be actualized. This is the realm of Reason, as contrasted with the reasoning which applies only to the temporal order. It is the realm of ontology as contrasted with that of epistemology, the hard and fast versus the flux. This absolute realm, however, the laws of which science conceives it its purpose to formulate, is a realm of which nothing can be stated excepting *that* it exists as a necessary conditioner of all proximate experience. All attempts to ascribe definite properties to it must fail, inasmuch as such attempts originate of necessity in the temporal order and are therefore determined by the ideas, backgrounds, apperceptions and histories of particular individuals or cultures. Man can never escape from this realm of his own concepts, determined as they are by all the language and art forms constituting his world of relative values. But if the absolute order, that is the realm beyond experience (or, if you will, the realm prior to or underlying experience), can never be known in the form of differentiated parts (just in so far as such differentiations would involve concrete predicates, which, as we have found, are impossible), it must be taken to represent merely an undifferentiated (so far as man is concerned) conditioner or presupposition of thought and experience. Here is what medieval scholastic philosophers called God, and what mystics have called the Oneness of All Things.

Nor must it be supposed that this mystic element is postulated by modern science in any supercilious tongue-in-cheek way. For unless science believed that there were such an absolute order, its own formulations of experience could never be given the status of "discoveries". Rather would they be conceived as mere arbitrary or wilful constructions. Accordingly science must insist upon this noumenal (as distinguished from the phenomenal) realm. This much faith it must have; for to doubt this would lead to eventual skepticism. "I do not seek to know in order to believe, but I believe in order to know," said Anselm in the Eleventh Century. And, though they may not like to admit it, all modern scientists must take this stand. Both philosophy and mysticism, therefore, acknowledge the same temporal order. Both are alike in asserting: "That art thou."

It is interesting to note in this connection, not only that Platonism led to the mystic Neoplatonism of Plotinus and Augustine, but that the world of modern physics, with its dependence on mathematical formulations in the realm of the atom, has lost all semblance of substance and has become frankly a world of ideal relationships, which science conceives it its purpose to express in the simplest (that is, the most unified) form.

It has thus become impossible in a dual sense to dissociate philosophy (and logic) from mysticism. For, on the one hand, the elements from which philosophy starts rep-

resent in themselves mystically perceived premises. And, on the other hand, the goal at which philosophy aims is the unification of experience in a oneness which is also ultimately mystic. The struggle for individual maturity, through thought and deed, is therefore a struggle which involves a paradoxical relationship of the individual to the world. In one sense it means a journey through the world of actuality, a process of making decisions in one dilemma after another which the world presents. These decisions, from the simplest acts of cognition to the more difficult problems of life, are through and through worldly, that is, they involve a knowledge of, or insight into, a series of objective realities. Yet the complete spiritual maturity sought in this way would, if ever achieved, be divorced entirely from these worldly elements. It is this fundamental paradox which has marked much of the world's deepest thinking. Spirit and matter, good and evil, the world and the individual—these are merely a few of the many forms which this basic problem assumes.

The mystic, feeling an inner assurance that life itself is a simple matter of direct experience, throws overboard all attempts to arrive at satisfying solutions to problems by the use of reason. It is because of this, as we have found, that the mystic comes to oppose philosophy itself, which endeavours to arrive at answers through the processes of thought. These processes lead, says the

mystic, to a high degree of individuation, that is, to an individual stuffed, as it were, with artificial concepts which give him a keen and alert self-consciousness, together with a sense of clear-cut differentiation from the remainder of the world. Yet the objective of thought is knowledge synthesized into a supreme unity. It means ultimately the grasping of reality in its entirety, and thus involves an internal state of being which many even identify with unconsciousness, since in such a state there would no longer be a world unabsorbed in the individual and therefore a world to give rise to inner experiences. Accordingly the intellectualist is in a sense destroying himself. Seeking implicitly all knowledge (and therefore mystic unconsciousness, or superconsciousness), he relies on the very process of conceptualizing which *cuts him off* from his goal. Hence the intellect can yield only a negative sort of growth, its expression representing in truth a contraction to a mathematical point, the point of consciousness. The true fulfilment of the individual, maintains the mystic, lies rather in a direct and non-intellectual experience of grasping the infinite without the intervention of perverting concepts. One must storm the fortress of reality barehanded, he maintains, and accordingly he exchanges the tools of knowledge for the exercises or practices which enable him to achieve direct *rapproch* with the infinite, his state of Nirvana.

RICHARD ROTHCHILD

IS MAN BOUND OR FREE?

[These two articles do not present opposing views, though one is by a Western man of science whose researches have gained recognition and the second by a Hindu philosopher respected for his clear perception and lucid exposition. **H. Stanley Redgrove, B. Sc., F. I. C.**, examines the elements of chance and choice in the principle of Causation operating in Nature. **Professor M. Hirianna** carries the reader forward in his excellent study and shows how very practical and helpful is the ancient doctrine of *Karma*. Both the scientist and the philosopher come to the same conclusion—Man is free, because with the aid of his past experience and present endeavour he creates his own future.—EDS.]

I.—FREEDOM

Every morning when the hour hand of my grandfather's clock stands at 7 and the minute hand at 11, the hammer strikes eight times on the bell of the clock, and, at the same moment, unless it is Sunday, Jones issues from the door of his villa to catch the 8-10 to the City. I can tell when it is 8 o'clock equally well by looking at the hands of the clock, waiting for the clock to chime, or watching the doors of Jones's house. Of course, sometimes Jones is laid up ill and does not appear, but then it has also happened on occasions that my clock has failed to function properly, and has needed the attention of an expert.

The case of Brown, who lives next door to Jones, is, however, quite different. I cannot tell the time by watching *his* departure from his abode. He is liable to go out at any time, and there are days when apparently he does not leave the house at all.

I have discussed the difference in the behaviour of Jones and Brown with various mutual acquaintances.

"Well," I am told, "Brown is an

artist. Artists are erratic fellows. You cannot rely upon them." Of Jones, on the other hand, I hear it said: "He is a man of regular habits—as regular as clockwork."

Three things I specially notice here. One is the likening of the behaviour of Jones to that of clockwork. Another is the ascription of his regularity to the formation of habit. The third is the fact that the regularity of Jones's behaviour wins a certain approval which is withheld from the more erratic conduct of Brown. The latter cannot be relied upon.

Smith, who is an old-fashioned materialist, has something more to say on the subject. "Yes," he asserts. "Jones's behaviour is exactly like clockwork, because it is determined by the same laws of Nature. Does he not provide a striking refutation of the nonsense you prattle about the freedom of the will? He must catch this train in order to be in his office by 9 o'clock. He is not free. Nor is Brown. Brown's actions are determined in the same way, only the forces governing them, the desires which impel him, are more complex.

What you call 'freedom' is simply complexity. Analyse this complexity, and so-called 'freedom' vanishes."

I do not argue with Smith. I prefer to observe him as an interesting psychological phenomenon.

There is no doubt about the preference of the human mind for uniformity. If events occur in a certain manner on one occasion, we anticipate their occurrence in the same manner again, and feel a sense of satisfaction when this happens. Is this anything more than a manifestation of the mind's inertia, even if the mind seems tireless in its search to reduce to order the seeming chaos of raw experience? Thought having traversed a certain path tends to traverse the same path again. Uniformity is conservative of mental effort. It can be relied upon.

Seemingly diverse phenomena must be brought into relationship with each other and harmonised. Nothing could seem more dissimilar than Brown's behaviour and that of my grandfather's clock. However, Jones's conduct provides a link between them, and my materialist friend envisages it as enabling him to explain the capriciousness of the former in terms of the uniformities of the latter.

It occurs to me that an attempt the exact reverse of this would provide a hypothesis equally plausible.

Jones has formed a *habit*. Suppose the clock has formed a habit; or, rather, suppose, every material atom of which the clock is

composed has done so. Spirit is free; matter is bound. Materialists who would have us believe that spirit is no more than a phenomenon of matter, are obliged to attempt to explain away the freedom of spirit as a mere illusion. We can, however, retain both freedom and determinism as real characters of different classes of behaviour on the hypothesis that matter is spirit completely constrained by habit.

This is one line of thought. Another is that the seeming regularity of the clock's behaviour is itself an illusion, created by the clock's complexity. This latter line of thought is of particular importance, because it is one which recent research in physical science is gradually compelling thinking minds to accept.

It is remarkable how philosophies in many ways hotly opposed to each other agree in disliking the concept of *chance*. To those which posit the reality of spirit, chance seems repellent because every event is conceived of as being caused by will. Materialism rejects this theory of causation; yet with equal vehemence rejects the concept of chance as well.

It is desirable to emphasise the entire distinction between the concepts of causation held by these opposing schools of thought. The causes of the spiritualist (using this term in its strict and not its popular meaning) are active and efficient causes. Moreover, underlying these active and efficient causes are final causes—the ends in view. It is true that, in the early history

of materialism, physical forces were substitutes for the free wills of spirits as active and efficient causes. But this view has long been obsolete; and causation, from the materialist point of view, means no more than a fixed order in the occurrence of events. It stands for the possibility of prediction.

It is easy to see how chance can find no place in materialist philosophy. But the case is otherwise with those philosophies which posit free-will. From the point of view of an observer, the behaviour of a free spirit has the fundamental character of a series of chance events, *i. e.*, it cannot be predetermined. Those of us, therefore, who believe in freedom must also believe in chance; since chance is no more than the external appearance of freedom.

It will not be denied that there are events which, apparently at any rate, are chance events. The manner in which a penny falls when it is tossed in the air provides a simple case in point. We say it is as likely to come down heads as it is to come down tails. The materialist, of course, would urge that the event is not really a chance one, and that if we had at hand all the data relating to the penny and the way in which it was tossed up we could accurately predict whether it would come down heads or tails. However, we have not this data, and for all practical purposes, the way in which the penny falls is treated as being a purely chance event.

Moreover, mathematics has developed a special calculus for

dealing with events which are, apparently, chance events, without concerning itself with the question whether the events are really chance events or only apparently the product of chance. This is the theory of probability. A most important contribution to this theory was made, many years ago, by Jacques Bernoulli. He proved that "in the long run, all events will tend to occur with a relative frequency proportional to their original probabilities." The full significance of this "law of chance," as it may be called, is only just beginning to be realised. For what Bernoulli really did was to show that chance events observed in the mass would appear to have all the characteristics of a deterministic system.

Consider the case of tossing pennies, and suppose the fall one way or the other to be a purely chance event. That is to say, the probability of the penny coming down heads is exactly one-half. It follows, from Bernoulli's theorem, that if we continue to toss the penny up, the number of times it comes down heads will approximate, more and more closely as we continue the tossing, to the number of times it comes down tails.

The way in which pennies fell when tossed would, to all appearance, be determined by a natural law having the character of rigidity postulated by materialist philosophy, although actually the product of pure chance.

Laws, such as this, are statistical laws. They are not really rigid. It is possible that, now and again

the pennies might come down in some other manner, though it is not likely. Actually, most of our conduct is based upon more or less subconscious calculations of probabilities. I go to the station to catch the 9-30 to town. I cannot be certain that it will run; but in view of the fact that it is so scheduled in the time-table, it is highly probable that it will do so.

Moreover, important businesses have been built up on the study and commercial application of statistical laws. What, at first sight, would seem more risky than to sell an individual an annuity for life or to agree, in return for a fixed annual payment from him, to pay his heirs a fixed sum when he dies? Certainly, if one sold a single annuity or granted a single life insurance, the transaction would be extremely risky. It would have the character of a pure gamble. Nevertheless, when numerous annuities are sold and numerous life insurances granted properly, the element of risk becomes practically negligible; and, as is well known, the insurance business is both profitable and secure to those engaged in it.

The question arises: Are statistical laws merely makeshifts because the phenomena involved are so complex that we have not yet been able to unravel the true laws of Nature governing the events; or, alternatively, are all the so-called laws of Nature, which are not mere truisms, really statistical laws?

Modern physical science is being forced to adopt the latter alter-

native; and this means, however hateful the idea may be to those reared in materialist ways of thinking, that the so-called laws of Nature are the product of chance. Let us express it otherwise and say: *Out of freedom emerges order.*

When the work of physical science was restricted to observing the behaviour of matter in the mass, this behaviour appeared to be determined by perfectly rigid laws. The behaviour of my grandfather's clock is a case in point. But it is now known that every tangible piece of matter is an exceedingly complex structure. Even the atom is highly complex. Physical science has passed beyond the atom, and is now concerning itself with the behaviour of electrons, not in the mass, but as individuals. Now the behaviour of an isolated electron is peculiar. It shows a certain capriciousness like that of my friend Brown. You cannot predetermine its conduct exactly. Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy shows that the more exactly the position of an electron is determined, the more uncertain becomes its velocity, while, on the other hand, the more exactly its velocity is determined, the more uncertain becomes its position. And this lack of determinacy arises, not because we know too little about the electron, but because we know too much. There is no question here of seeming departure from exactitude because of complexity, which further investigation may be hoped to clear up and reduce to order. On the contrary,

the electron exhibits a certain degree of freedom, just because of its simplicity. It is when we turn our attention to the behaviour of myriads of electrons, that is, to matter in the mass, that seemingly exact laws begin to operate: laws, however, which we must now recognise as being essentially statistical laws, concerned with probabilities only, just like the laws on which the insurance companies base the prices they ask for life annuities and the premiums they require for life insurances.

The individual possesses freedom. The group is subject to law. This is the basic truth which modern physical science has, very reluctantly, discovered. Biological science appears to have lagged behind, and to be more completely wedded to materialism than the physical sciences. But the researches of Professor Hans Driesch demonstrate, as he convincingly shows in his contribution to *The Great Design*, which I recently reviewed in these columns, that the same truth underlies biological phenomena. There is design in relation to the whole; but this design is mingled with contingency. Every unit of which the whole consists, whether electron, germ-cell, or spirit, possesses a measure of freedom.

This view of life and Nature is, really, the common-sense view on which every normal person, even the materialist, acts. No one supposes that he can do exactly as he pleases; but everyone is conscious of the possibility of choosing between alternative lines of action.

I am quite certain, for example, that I might have said "Everyone is aware that he can select one out of a number of possible lines of action," instead of expressing my thought in the words used above.

The materialist is only a materialist when he thinks metaphysically. When he acts, he acts as a (more or less) free agent. After he has acted, he may, if he pleases, console himself by reflecting that he has acted in accordance with the "strongest" motive, and that therefore his action was determined. As, however, neither he nor anyone else can tell which is the strongest motive until he has actually acted, this determinism is a purely fictitious one. Moreover, the assumed analogy between motives and physical forces is a bad one. For, if two forces act on a body in different directions, the body does not tend to become accelerated in the direction of a stronger force, but in a direction which deviates from this by a greater or lesser angle, the value of which can be computed, given the necessary data relating to the forces.

Man has freedom—not unlimited freedom, but freedom, nevertheless—because he is an *individual*. His individuality, his self-consciousness, has not been easily won. Time was when he was conscious of himself merely as a member of a group, and group-behaviour is subject to statistical law.

It is remarkable and regrettable that to-day we witness attempts to reduce man once again to his primitive state as a mere group

member. The Communist philosophy of life would have the individual merge his consciousness in that of his class: the Fascist philosophy would have him merge it in that of the nation. Both these

philosophies, as practical creeds of life, may be described as attempts to deprive spirit of its freedom, to convert spirit into matter, and to make of life a meaningless, mechanical affair.

H. S. REDGROVE

II.—KARMA AND FREE-WILL

The doctrine of karma is an essential part of all or nearly all the Indian creeds, and belief in it has always had a profound influence on the life of the people. It extends the principle of causation to the sphere of human conduct and signifies that, as every event in the physical world is determined by its antecedents, so everything that happens in the moral realm is pre-ordained. Critics conclude from this that karma stands for fatalism, and remain content with that conclusion without examining the doctrine any further. We propose to consider here one or two of its other aspects with a view to finding out whether it is really fatalistic or whether it at all leaves room for the exercise of freedom. But before we enter upon this task, it is necessary to be quite clear as to what we mean by "freedom". As it is usually pointed out in modern works on Ethics in discussing the problem of Free-will, freedom does not mean mere caprice. It is not the absence of all determination; rather it is *self-determination*. To be controlled by extraneous factors in what one does is not to be a free

agent, but to be determined by oneself is the very essence of autonomy. When, therefore, we ask whether karma gives any scope for freedom of action, all that we mean is whether it does or does not preclude self-determination.

We have stated that the doctrine extends the principle of causation to the sphere of human action. It does more, for in the case of every act it traces the causes that pre-determine it to the particular individual that acts. Since, however, those causes cannot all be found within the narrow limits of a single life, there arises the need for postulating the theory of *samsāra* or the continued existence of the self (*jīva*) in a succession of lives. Thus the theory of transmigration is a necessary corollary to the doctrine of karma. The fact of moral consciousness, according to Kant, is the guarantee of personal immortality; in a similar way, the law of karma is here our assurance of the truth of transmigration. If now we look at life in this new perspective, the *punya* and *pāpa* (or, to use a single term for both, *karma**) that explain the present

conduct of a person and the good or evil that follows from it are eventually traceable to his own actions in the past, for destiny or karma—as observed by an old authority*—is only another form of deeds done in a previous birth. There being therefore no external Fate constraining man to act as he does, he is free in the sense referred to above and cannot therefore absolve himself from responsibility for his actions.

Here, no doubt, a question will be asked as to when the responsibility for what one does was *first* incurred. But such a question is really inadmissible, for it takes for granted that there was a time when the self was without karma or, to state the same otherwise, when it was without any moral disposition. Such a view of the self is an abstraction as meaningless as that of mere disposition which characterises no one. "Self" always means a self with a certain stock of dispositions; and this fact is indicated in Indian expositions by describing karma as *anadi* or "beginningless". It means that no matter how far back we trace the moral history of an individual, we shall never arrive at a stage when he was devoid of all character. Thus at all stages, it is self-determination; and the karma doctrine, so far from implying the imposition of any constraint from outside, assures us that every man constitutes his own "fate". So deep is the conviction of some as regards the adequacy of karma to account for the diversity of human conditions that they see no need to

acknowledge the existence of even God, conceived as the creator of the world and as the fountain of all law.

It is clear from what has been stated that the attitude which belief in the karma doctrine engenders is not fatalistic in the sense in which that term is ordinarily understood. But it may be said that, even granting that we alone are in the long run accountable for whatever happens to us now, we are not able to help ourselves in any manner, because we cannot alter the course of our past karma which leads to those happenings. It may be that the constraint is not external; but constraint it is, and there can therefore be no freedom of action. In meeting this objection, it is necessary to draw attention to a point to which we have not so far specifically referred, *viz.*, the idea of moral retribution underlying the karma doctrine. Whatever we knowingly do will, sooner or later, bring us the result we merit; and there is no way of escape from it. What we sow, we must reap. That is, the karma doctrine signifies not merely that the events of our life are determined by their antecedent causes, but also that there is absolute justice in the rewards and punishments that fall to our lot in life. The law of karma accordingly is not a blind mechanical law; it is essentially ethical. It is this conviction that there are in reality no iniquities in life, which explains the absence of any feeling of bitterness—so apt to follow in the wake of pain and

* *Adrishta* is a more appropriate word but, for the sake of simplicity, we use *karma*.

* See *Yajñavalkya-smṛiti*, I. 349.

sorrow—which is noticeable even among common people when any misfortune befalls them. They blame neither God nor their neighbour but only themselves for it. Deussen refers* thus to the case of a blind person whom he met during his Indian tour: "Not knowing that he had been blind from birth, I sympathised with him and asked by what unfortunate accident the loss of sight had come upon him. Immediately and without showing any sign of bitterness, the answer was ready to his lips, 'By some crime committed in a former birth.' "†

The implication of this idea of "retributive justice" is that the karma doctrine is grounded in a moral view of the universe, and that it therefore commits man to the obligations of a true moral life. It points to the truth that there is an ideal of life which it is the first duty of man to pursue and that it can be reached only through incessant striving. In other words, the doctrine presupposes the possibility of moral growth, and the conclusion to be drawn from it is that freedom is not merely compatible with, but is actually demanded by it. If man were only a creature of his congenital impulses—altogether powerless to rise above them—it would be poor comfort for him to know that he was not the victim of any alien Fate. This does not, however, mean that he can avoid the consequences of his past karma. His life, in that respect, is

characterised by the strictest necessity; and he has to submit to all the pleasant and unpleasant experiences to which it may lead. They are pre-destined results from which he can never free himself. So far, karma does imply necessity; but, as stated above, it implies freedom also, viz., in the matter of ethical advance. Only we should not suppose that life's interests will thereby become bifurcated, for ethical advance is, in this view, to be made the sole aim of *all* activities. By thus adopting the betterment of one's moral nature as the goal of all endeavour, one may grow indifferent to what happens in the present as the result of past karma, though unable to avoid it. This is the well-known teaching of the *Gita*† that we should engage ourselves in the activities of life, not for the particular results which they may bring but for the purpose of self-conquest.

We have so far assumed that the necessity involved in karma is absolute; but that is not the only view held about it. Some are of opinion that karma is only *one* of the causes that explain the course of events in a man's life. There are other causes as well, of which the one significant for us here is self-effort or *purusha-kāra*, as it is termed. We cannot dispense with karma altogether for, as it must be within the experience of all, result is not always proportionate to effort; and the discrepancy between the two, if we should ex-

clude chance, is necessarily to be accounted for by assuming a cause that operates in an unknown manner. It is just this unknown cause that is karma. This view is explicitly maintained, for example, in the *Law-book* of Yajñavalkya (I. 349-51), where the question is considered with particular reference to the need for initiative on the part of a king in extending his sovereignty; and the solution reached is that, although karma is certainly a factor to be reckoned with in all undertakings, it is not the only factor determining the result. "As a chariot cannot move on a single wheel, so destiny [*i. e.*, in the sense of past karma] cannot accomplish its end until it is aided by human endeavour." It means that karma is only a co-operative

element, and is powerless by itself to bring about any result. "Without present action," as it was stated in the April number of this Journal (p. 202), "past destiny cannot show itself." It is always open for man to help it or hinder it, so that there is scope in this view also for choice between two alternatives. The point that is important for us is that, whichever be the explanation we adopt, the doctrine of karma is not fatalistic, and that it neither excludes personal effort nor destroys the sense of responsibility. Only there is a limit to the exercise of freedom according to the first explanation, in that it restricts it to the pursuit of the higher life; but there is no such limit according to the second.

M. HIRIYANNA

In a great pool lived three fishes: Forethought, Readywit, and Fatalist. One day some fishermen came to the pool and Forethought heard one of them say: "There are plenty of fish in here. To-morrow we will go fishing." On hearing it Forethought reflected: "I will take Readywit and Fatalist and move to another lake." But Readywit thought that he would protect himself by means devised to suit the occasion. And Fatalist said: "Who knows whether the fishermen will come here or not? The proverb says:

Since scamp and sneak and snake
So often undertake
A Plan that does not thrive
The world wags on alive.

Therefore I am determined not to go. What is to be will be."

Forethought alone went to another lake.

The next day the fisherman came and cast the net. But Readywit pretended to be dead and the fishermen therefore laid him on the bank from where he leapt back again in the pool without being detected.

Fatalist stuck his nose in the meshes of the net struggling until they pounded him repeatedly with clubs and so killed him. So,

Forethought and Readywit thrive
Fatalist can't keep alive.

—The Panchatantra.

* *Philosophy of the Upanishads* (Eng. Tr.) p. 313.

† The question of human freedom is discussed in this work, though all too briefly, in chapter III, st. 33-43.

DREAM INTERPRETATION CHINESE—GREEK—ISLAMIC

[R. L. Mégroz is a poet, biographer and critic with a steadily growing circle of admirers. He has contributed several essays on the subject of Dreams in these pages: "Dreams in the Western World" (March 1931); "Dreams of Future Events" (May, 1932); "Tippoo Sultan's Dreams: A Glance at Mohammedan Oneirocriticism" (January 1934). Our readers will find this particular article of more than ordinary interest.—EDS.]

Oneiromancy or dream interpretation has been as universal as religion; it has, like religion, assumed varying forms according to the traditions and development of its practitioners. Until the comparatively modern era of post-medieval Europe such divination had also been more or less a religious function—more so, for example, in Islam than in China which, as we in the West are apt to forget, had the teachings of Confucius and Lâo-Tsze as well as Buddhism as part of its intellectual and spiritual traditions, when Europe was still a chaos of barbarism and purely local civilisations. The two chief Chinese works, the *Meng Shu*, or Books of Dreams, written during the great T'ang dynasty, which lasted from 618 to 906, and the *Meng Chan I Chih* in Seven Books, written by Ch'en Shih-Yuan in 1562 (in the Ming dynasty), have a modern note of practical observation and of philosophy or ethics rather than the religious mixture of these with inspiration and superstition which strikes one in Islamic and Greek dream interpretation. The "flowery" language, as we speak of it, of the classical Chinese literature, which often

enables us to share something of the meaning of Chinese poems, even through the great barrier of an alien language, is a kind of fossilised dream imagery, showing that poetry had become secular long before it did in the West. Even the religious mythology of the Chinese seems more secular, and it may be that such ideas as that of the Nine Celestial Spheres, into which Heaven is divided, were sources of the similar Greek ideas. In my purely superficial study of these vast subjects I have come across several similarly striking comparisons. Although necessary limitations of space forbid examining or speculating on them now, the reference to such curious parallels points to the need that any student must feel for some common background of philosophy against which to set in perspective the various codes or techniques of dream interpretation that were evolved, so far as we know, almost independently of each other.

This is where, I have come to think, the theosophical system of intuitive thought largely fills up a gap, in the absence of what we call scientific knowledge of man's spiritual activity in sleep or trance.

Nobody questions the fact that dreaming is still a very mysterious activity, which is by no means completely explained as fantasy, imagination, or as irrational thought that is a wish-fulfilment achieved when the waking reason cannot censor it.

"Man is undeniably endowed with a double set [of senses]: with natural or physical senses,—these to be safely left to physiology to deal with; and, with sub-natural or spiritual senses belonging entirely to the province of psychological science," says H. P. Blavatsky (*U. L. T. Pamphlet, No. 11*, p. 3). She goes on to point out that the prefix *sub* in the term sub-natural does not imply something of secondary importance: on the contrary it refers to the spiritual Ego or Self that sounds the fundamental key-note of man's nature—a capricious, uncertain instrument which can thus be tuned to a dominant chord. Whatever degree of importance or "reality" we impute to the outer and inner self of the individual, the assumption of some kind of duality is inevitable unless all the vast literature of dream interpretation is to be rejected as lunatic ravings.

To pass as rapidly as possible over some salient features of this literature, it is especially noteworthy that in both Greek and Islamic oneiromancy, as in the Chinese, we find the broad distinction between true and false dreams. The Greek idea occurs in two forms, one purely poetic, as the Gate of Horn or the Gate of Ivory through which the dream message

came, true dreams passing through the Gate of Horn, false through the Gate of Ivory. The other form, typical of the early Homeric literature, was that the gods, being all too human in their temperamental caprices, sometimes sent true and sometimes false dreams to sleeping heroes. The ghosts of dead men, imprisoned in Hades, could also act as daimons, appearing to the living in dreams. The general tendency of the Greeks was to believe in benignant rather than malignant demons, although they recognised both. One of the curious similarities with the Chinese was their respect for and faith in the demons of the tribe's or the family's ancestors.

According to Tâbir, the Islamic art of divination, dreams that are merely illusions might be suggestions of a Dîv, an agent of Iblîs, the Mohammedan Satan. But false dreams were also attributed to the dreamer's evil disposition, and to wrong eating and drinking.

One of the chief sources of the Arabic writers was the Greek oneirocriticism of Artemidorus, who not only treats of such distinctions but gives highly suggestive examples of the dream imagery of Greek citizens. It was nearly always a God or a Hero who appeared in the dream, and the interpretation depended partly on the character of the spirit that was dreamed of. Thus an amorous dream might be auspicious if Aphrodite figured in it, and an omen of peril if such a dream centred round a chaste goddess like Artemis. Bodily as well as mental health were recognised objects of the Mohammedan

dream interpretations as well as of the Greek oracles. The shrines of the healer Asklepios became the most popular among the Greeks who consulted the oracles and slept in the precincts of the temples to ensure having true dreams. It is interesting to note here that, whatever connection may one day be traced between Greek and Chinese mythology, the Greeks certainly derived some of their ideas from the ancient Egyptians, and Asklepios has been identified as an imitation of the Egyptian I-m-hotep, "scribe of the gods" and healer.

The Egyptian and Greek practice of holy incubation in a temple as a means of acquiring esoteric wisdom was but the expression of the need for purification and self-discipline, a recognition of which also is a common feature of all the oneiromantic literatures. The same idea is finely expressed in the Platonic dialogues, and it is not difficult to see how the discourse of Socrates, on the principle of Love as a means towards knowing the Absolute Good and Beautiful, is a description of the path to wisdom that is always being traced by religion.

Dreams, whether from disembodied spirits, or from our own mind or the mind of another living person, produce results in us largely according to what we are; and hence, says the African Greek, Synesius, "wisdom is to be used on oneself". In his philosophical superiority to the cruder methods of the dream interpreters—all the mumbo-jumbo practised to induce faith in the unsophisticated—Syne-

sius is even more modern than Plato. His precept is that the individual should observe and record his own dreams. The cultivation of dreaming was advocated by Madame Blavatsky as a means to "clairvoyance," which is an unfortunate word because of its varying implications, but it comes to the same thing. Mme. Blavatsky's insistence upon the importance of dreams and of the *positive* attitude of the dreamer's inner self began with the assumption that the goal was not any dream state at all, but one of illumination beyond the dreaming. The advanced Adept would not dream at all, but would become detached from the external or lower self to enter the spiritual plane of that divine wisdom which we who dream may glimpse through the concrete forms of imagination.

In order to understand the subject better, it is well to consider a little in detail what happens when one falls asleep, has dreams, and then enters Sushupti [the dreamless state]. As his outer senses are dulled the brain begins to throw up images, the reproductions of waking acts and thoughts, and soon he is asleep. He has then entered a plane of experience which is as real as that just quitted, only that it is of a different sort. We may roughly divide this from the waking life by an imaginary partition on the one side, and from Sushupti by another partition on the other. In this region he wanders until he begins to rise beyond it into the higher. There no disturbances come from the brain action, and the being is a partaker to the extent his nature permits of the "banquet of the gods." But he has to return to waking state, and he can get back by no other road than the one he came upon, for, as Sushupti

extends in every direction and Swapna [dreaming] under it also in every direction, there is no possibility of emerging at once from Sushupti into Jagrata [waking]. And this is true even though on returning no memory of any dream is retained.

Now the ordinary non-concentrated man, by reason of the want of focus due to multitudinous and confused thought, has put his Swapna field or state into confusion, and in passing through it the useful and elevating experiences of Sushupti become mixed up and distorted, not resulting in the benefit to him as a waking person which is his right as well as his duty to have. . . . So it appears, then, that what he should try to accomplish is such a clearing up and vivification of Swapna state as shall result in removing the confusion and distortion existing there, in order that upon emerging into waking life he may retain a wider and brighter memory of what occurred in Sushupti. This is done by an increase of concentration upon high thoughts, upon noble purposes, upon all that is best and most spiritual in him while awake. . . . (W. Q. Judge, *U. L. T. Pamphlet No. 11*, pp. 12-13).

That is plain enough, although the quotation is necessarily incomplete. The point that I wish

to conclude with is that this rough outline and the other theosophical tenets on dreaming that I have read in *Transactions of the Blavatsky Lodge* embrace the main ideas that occur in the varied and sometimes vastly complicated and illogical codes of oneiromancy already referred to. They also agree essentially with the more philosophical expressions of ancient wisdom regarding the True, the Good and the Beautiful. And therefore when the theosophical systematisation of Hindu and other religious philosophies covers more esoteric things which are beyond a normal apprehension, there is at least the inference that here too within the rough shell of inadequate language may be wisdom worth trying to understand.

The field has of course been far too big to be methodically covered by this brief survey, but some readers may perhaps find suggestions for study in these discursive observations.

R. L. MÉGROZ

THE ADVANCE OF SCIENCE AND THE LIFE OF THE COMMUNITY

[Miss Marjorie Allanson (B. Sc., London) is at present Assistant Lecturer on Zoology in King's College, University of London. Until recently she was associated with the organization of the Press Bureau for meetings of the British Association.—EDS.]

The Aberdeen meeting of the British Association reflected the mood of the nation. The enthusiasm with which for ten years the government and industrial concerns endowed the search for pure knowledge and supported an army of scientific workers for the purpose of applying knowledge to the service of the nation and Empire has waned, to some extent. This is due to no slackening of effort of the scientific workers themselves, whose post-war achievements in pure and applied science have been remarkable. Indeed, it is due to the spectacular character of those very successes which have come to the world too fast to be absorbed without tearing the whole fabric of civilisation, since political and social institutions have shown no corresponding advance. Added to this, those operating the financial machinery of the world, who exercise a tremendous pressure upon political and social organisms, have altogether failed to grasp the significance of the new discoveries of science. And so while on the one hand science can look with pride on its achievements, on the other it can only contemplate with sorrow the new problems which it has projected into the arena of our political life because of those achievements.

Science has solved the problem of want. There is now no shortage of any of the material necessities of man. Vast areas which were formerly barren are now due to the work of economic botanists and agriculturalists, capable of producing food crops. There is scarcely one agricultural crop which has not been improved by the efforts of researchers to yield at least fifty per cent more than before the war. Diseases of plants are no longer the menace they were. Insect pests are rapidly coming under the control of the economic entomologist. The rigours of climate have lost their terrors owing to the remarkable results achieved in the selection and acclimatisation of plants. Animal diseases have been studied, and animal breeding and the study of pastures and animal foodstuffs have vastly improved the quality and quantity of the animal foods available for man. Yet the fear of starvation remains with many of the peoples of the world, under-nutrition is a commonplace of the large minority of the individual members of western nations, and the spectre of economic distress haunts the world as a whole. A million or more people starve in China from lack of cereals while the commodities they need are de-

stroyed for want of purchasers. Those habitual coffee-drinkers, the European peoples, are returning to their war-time substitutes for the beverage while Brazilian and African coffee-planters are being subsidised to make bonfires of their crops. Although the world can consume profitably at least twice the amount of textile materials which are produced, the cotton planters of America are being encouraged to plough in a large portion of their crops and to neglect protective measures against the spread of disease. The sugar planters of one part of the Empire, capable of producing the whole Empire's needs of sugar at comparatively low prices, see the British Government spending, in the form of a subsidy to sugar beet growers in Great Britain, a sum greater than the value of the sugar produced. The wheat producer of Canada and other parts of the Empire are probably watching with amazement the attempts of the Home Government to increase wheat production in England by granting a subsidy to the wheat farmers.

In another sphere science has profoundly influenced the life of the community. Physics and chemistry applied to means of communication have completely overcome the geographical barriers which formerly separated peoples. Aeroplanes can fly from one end of the world to another within a few days. Motor tractors can now range over vast deserts without fear of break-down. The spoken word can be radiated to the remot-

est parts of the earth in a fraction of a second. Barriers between nations and barriers between races should no longer exist. The possibilities of mutual co-operation of nation and nation and race and race were never greater. Yet during the past five years following the economic break-down of Europe, the thoughts of statesmen of most nations have been centred upon preparing for the emergency of further wars, and the energies of large sections of the populations of each country have been directed towards supplying munitions of war to those countries which do not possess the necessary resources to produce them for themselves. The relations between countries have been embittered because of the inability of nationally minded politicians, and internationally minded financiers, to resolve their differences of outlook: the relations between races are worse than ever, not because anthropological science has not brought more understanding, but because the differing standards of races, ethical and material, (particularly the latter), remain an irritant to the average individual member of each race: and in the anxiety to secure immediate economic security or political power the individual member or group of one race is prepared to forego the advantages of co-operation based on mutual toleration and sympathy.

This is the mad world which scientists are now beginning to contemplate with some realisation that it is their triumphs in the material field which have been

responsible in large measure for the chaos which exists. For the first time since the efforts of the encyclopædists of France in the eighteenth century, the scientific thinkers of various countries are realising that political and economic thought must be based on the realities of the material world and that the approach to political and economic problems must be scientific, *i.e.*, an impartial and unprejudiced contemplation of the full facts. Some understanding of the problems forced by science on a world which is still governed on irrational lines by irrational thinkers was manifest in many of the addresses which were delivered and the discussions which took place at the Aberdeen meeting of the British Association. The keynote of this new approach of science to life as a whole was struck in the brilliant presidential address of Sir James Jeans.

The realisation of the scientist's responsibility to the community was also evidenced by Professor Fawcett in his paper on the relation between the advance of geographical science and the life of the community. He made a plea for a systematic survey of man in relation to his environment in which all the major activities of man could be set down in a sufficiently precise form to assist anthropologists and geographers in their formulation of the general principles underlying the activities of man,—a mighty task indeed and one which will take many years to complete. As Professor Fawcett said, nearly every further applica-

tion of science to industry produces remarkable changes in the direction and distribution of man's activities in any particular country and very often has far-reaching effects on the life of communities in other countries. Professor Fawcett might have used for illustration the rise of the synthetic indigo industry based upon Perkins' researches in the middle of last century. It was nearly thirty years before Perkins' discovery was commercially applied, but within five years of its commercial application, five million indigo growers of India were either ruined or had to find an alternative crop because the products of their agricultural labours were supplanted by the products of a comparatively small chemical factory. In like manner the clove industry of Zanzibar and Pemba is threatened by the discovery of synthetic vanilin and it is apparently no remote possibility that the rubber growers of the world may be superseded by synthetic rubber-makers.

Professor Fawcett maintained that waste of human and material resources could have been prevented in many instances by wider knowledge of facts made known by geographers, but as yet not systematised. For instance, the efficiency of fisheries and of navigation is reduced owing to inadequate knowledge of tidal and other movements of sea waters, and accurate knowledge of England's freshwater resources might have been of great value in this year's drought.

The need for such a geographical

survey is great, and, because of the rapid changes in the world following the advances of science, the sooner this survey is made, the easier will be the formulation of general principles on the behaviour of man. Many geographical factors are more or less stable, for example, the distribution of the mining areas of the world which may have a considerable influence on the movements of population and the location of industries. These have been more critically surveyed than any other areas but a good deal of detailed work is still to be done. What are the factors, for example, which enable the tinplate industry of South Wales to survive in the face of competition of other countries where the raw materials are more plentiful, no less mutually accessible, and labour is cheap?

Professor Alan Ogilvy, in his address on "The nature and need of co-operative research into the physical and mental environment of the African natives" also made a plea for a wider outlook. Without such study, he maintained, the development of the native might proceed on entirely the wrong lines and administration suffer as it has done in the past, from want of knowledge of the relation of the native to his age-old environment. What we have to do now is to avoid the mistakes which have been made in our dealings with natives of other territories and to prevent too sudden a break with their traditional habits of life and thought and with their ethical standards. Professor Ogilvy might have gone further and em-

phasised that such studies are essential for the happy relations between the white, brown and indigenous populations in such areas.

These ideas were emphasised by Dr. May Mellanby in her contribution to the discussion on "Nutrition and its relation to disease," over which the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Walter Elliot, presided. Dr. Mellanby gave the results of her work on the causes of dental decay, carried on for many years past and as a result of which she declared that poor teeth were due to faults in diet and in particular to the faulty diets of child-bearing mothers. She quoted the interesting case of the difference between the teeth of the primitive Negro of the tropics and of his descendants in America, attributing the prevalence of disease among the latter to adoption of European clothing and diet. Again, the Eskimos had beautiful teeth; only three per cent were said to suffer from disease while they led the secluded life of their ancestors, but when they came in contact with white man's settlements, and altered their food and general mode of living accordingly, their teeth became susceptible to disease.

Within the compass of a short article it is impossible to do justice to the many brilliant contributions which were made to the meeting. Those selected for notice in this review must be taken as indicative of a definite change of outlook on the part of some of our investigators and exemplified by Sir James Jeans.

M. ALLANSON

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

THE CHANGING WEST AN AMERICAN IMPRESSION

[Irwin Edman, Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University, deals with the problem which several European writers of distinction have examined in our pages—what is there worth saving in European civilization, and how? Professor Edman in his closing sentence strikes the same note about the Orient as so many others have—a fact worthy of attention by all Asiatics.—EDS.]

In the light of the acute changes and necessities for change in the United States to-day, our intellectual leaders are being compelled by their own minds and consciences to re-examine not merely the economic assumptions of present-day society but the familiar axioms and assumptions of the nature of life and culture and civilization in the Western world. One outstanding index to this new tendency is a series of articles in the *New York Nation* by Joseph Wood Krutch. These have attracted very considerable attention by virtue of not only their intrinsic competence, but because they hit upon a theme, one might almost say a dilemma, of the educated man throughout the Western world. Mr. Krutch, one of the editors of *The Nation*, is known particularly in this country for a volume entitled *The Modern Temper*, which he published several years ago. In that book he canvassed the mood of disillusion of those who had lost the values of the religious and spiritual traditions of the past and had come to find nothing but nothingness in the high heraldings of the laboratory scientists, and of the naïve devotees of "Progress" in the nineteenth century. Mr. Krutch saw Science and Social Science revealing nothing but the "dark sea of nothingness, in which all who know may drown" (a quotation drawn from the poet Edwin Arlington Robinson). That book attracted special attention because it was the first semi-popular intellectual expression of the doubts that were coming over the complacency and dogmatism of the materialistic and empirical mind, the self-criticism beginning to overtake the provincial certainties of nineteenth-century science. The writer reviewed the book at the time under the caption, "Heartbreak House". The heartbreak consisted in the discovery of the emptiness of that "reality of matter in motion," of all of the universe, nature, life and experience conceived in exclusively physical and biological terms. Mr. Krutch neatly exploded in successive chapters "The Faith in the Laboratory," "The Faith in Psychology," the hopes for happiness and serenity that had been the Utopian promise of those social philosophers who still cherished as their major faith the Baconian ideal of the enlargement of the empire of man over Nature through physical

investigation and control. Physics, in the broadest sense, had become at once the great dogma and the great hope. Mr. Krutch exposed the pretentiousness of the dogma and the emptiness of the hope. One felt at the time in reading Mr. Krutch's book that one defect and limitation of his thinking was that his own disillusion came from having taken too seriously and too literally the dogmas of the nineteenth-century physio-progressives. And he did not indicate a way out, or a further step. He had apparently no intimations of any other philosophies than those whose emptiness he had so discerningly revealed.

This excursus into the recent past is relevant, for Mr. Krutch's analysis had wide repercussion in this country. His present series of articles is again a study in doubt, if not in disillusion. They were published during the past summer under the striking title, *Was Europe a Success?* What the author means is briefly the following: European civilization, the heritage of our cultural values, has been built up through centuries. It has produced among other things the concepts and the possibility (for a limited class) of personality, individuality, freedom. With the traditional European economy are associated all that, as civilized beings, Western men care about—art, science, the finenesses and nobilities of life. But they were built up—Mr. Krutch admits or insists—at the cost of injustice, inequality, underprivilege for many. A revolutionary change in econom-

ics and politics might destroy precisely the only things that make life, for a civilized being, worth living.

Mr. Krutch's series of essays is important because it calls attention to the dilemma in which a sensitive heir to the culture of the West finds himself. The very changes in society which his intelligence and his sense of justice may lead him to advocate threaten to destroy precisely the culture and freedom which give meaning to his or to any life. But it may be suggested that Mr. Krutch is guilty of gross narrowness and nearsightedness in identifying the tradition, so to put it, of the Spirit of Man with "Europe".

In the series of comments on Mr. Krutch's articles there is one from the well-known and flamboyant pen of Mr. H. L. Mencken which illustrates the same point. Mr. Mencken thinks Europe is worth saving, forsooth, because Europe is in danger of reverting to the "Asiatic," of which he gives Communism and Fascism as illustrations. Mr. Mencken, who has in his day had wide influence here, apparently has never heard of Oriental philosophy or religion.

Mr. Krutch has been called to task for practically identifying all the higher values of civilization with one Continent, by a number of well-known thinkers who comment at some length on his article in a recent issue of *The Nation*. "Europe," writes Mr. Russell, "has been superior to other continents, not in art or morals, but in knowledge [by which Mr. Russell,

also provincial, means "physical science"] and power that comes from knowledge." Mr. Russell questions the "superiority" of Europe on the basis of its art or thought and suggests Chinese art and thought (as he might have suggested Indian) as having elements of value that in some respects Europe has never equalled. These essays on *Was Europe a Success?* (for all their importance as stating the issue for the educated man: the conflict between culture and revolution) are none the less another of the many illustrations one might find in Western writing of how little realization the Western mind has of the richness and variety of Eastern thought and the emphasis and accents on mind and spirit that are always, as it were, a minority report in Western analysis.

These essays of Mr. Krutch and the comments upon them are im-

portant as revealing within what a narrow framework so much of discussion in our Western intellectual setting moves. Our immediate problems are, in all conscience, pressing enough. One might be excused for neglecting Eastern thought in matters of local Western economics, but Plato, the source-book of Western thought, has Eastern sources, and, in modern times, thinkers as different from each other as Schopenhauer and Santayana have turned to the East for correctives to that simple mechanism, that absorption in time and in instrumentalities which has been one of the limitations of the mind of Europe—and America—in recent centuries. Where one begins to discuss the ultimate values of life, the morally and the spiritually real, to neglect or forget the East is to forget half our own culture and half the issues of philosophy.

IRWIN EDMAN

A B C Ethics From Life's Storybook. Written and illustrated by QUAN WING. (The Christopher Publishing House, Boston, U. S. A. \$1.25)

This is a collection of stories for children. They are thoroughly unsectarian, and the writer has a fine philosophical basis on which she has erected a temple of morality not only suitable for the children but understandable by them. Each story, only a page long,

has an illustration on the opposite page, and their aim is directing the children's "inherent imagination along moral lines so that they may see—in the formative period before the age of seven, when the character is most easily impressed—that there is a great adventure and a wonderful lesson hidden in the small, commonplace happenings of every-day-life."

S.

WESTERN VIEWS ON ORIENTAL LORE

A TRIAD

[More and more Western publicists turn to the Eastern doctrines for help and guidance. Below we print three reviews which deal appreciatively with the three distinct fields they embrace. **Hugh Ross Williamson** approves the order of society pictured in the old Code of Manu; **C. E. M. Joad** values the chastening effect of Indian philosophy on Western readers, and **Claude Houghton** pays a tribute to Eastern Mysticism, so grossly misrepresented in the past.—EDS.]

I.—SOCIAL ORDER*

An eminent Nonconformist divine, anxious about civilization, recently completed a tour of the world. On his return to England he delivered himself of the opinion—given gratis to a Fleet Street organ—that "Western civilisation has less moral authority in the world than it has had for many long years." He also opined that "the East is waiting for Europe to commit suicide". If the latter statement, in so far as it might be held to imply a wish, may be doubted, the former is certainly an understatement. The moral authority of the West declined some centuries ago, when, in fact, the Catholic synthesis (which incorporated the wisdom of the Greeks and the practical energy of the Romans) was displaced by an individualism unrelated to tradition. The Nonconformist divine was, in all probability, not thinking of that: he was looking back regretfully, one imagines, to the days of the Good Queen, when her particular portion of the West "led the world" and accepted the admiration due to the mystical morality of Free Trade and the ethical sublimity of *laissez faire*.

The consequences of the fatal disproportion of those times—the elevation of the *vaishya* above the *brahman*, the merchant above the teacher, is at last becoming so plain that it cannot escape the notice of even the most superficial observer. To all observers, superficial or not, the clear exposition contained in this introduction to Manu

may be recommended. For it is a commentary on to-day. Here, in the code of Manu, is the essence of the only social theory which can save civilization. Here conflicting forces are subdued into harmony. By it—allowing for the non-essentials of a particular political situation—our own standards must be judged. It may be fanciful to see with M. Jacolliot the Egyptian Manes, the Cretan Minos, the Hebrew Moses as derivatives of the Sanskrit Manu; but whether that assumption is baseless or not, we may agree with Mr. Motwani that "Manu may be said to be the father of all social thinkers of the East and the West, the first to have conceived a perfect and well-planned society and to have pointed out the processes of its attainments."

The author has done a service for contemporary thinkers in stressing the fundamental importance of *dharma*, which, he says, "cannot be translated as a bundle of taboos imposed on the individual by the group in which he is born". It is rather, "his duty to himself, and to the group, arising out of the intellectual perception of his place in the scale of life". The Saxon word which would seem the best rendering is "doom," used in its original and most profound sense. And it is certain that Western society must learn something of this "doom" of Manu, if it wishes to escape another, more colloquial "doom".

HUGH ROSS WILLIAMSON

Manu: A Study In Hindu Social Theory. BY KEWAL MATWANI (Ganesh & Co., Madras Rs. 3.)

II.—PHILOSOPHY*

The philosophy of Bhedabheda means roughly the philosophy of "identity in difference". The world, it is obvious, is in some sense a unity; equally obviously it exhibits diversity. It appears, in short, to be both one and many. Can this appearance be real? Many philosophers have argued that it cannot, and have insisted that the Universe is either a chaotic manifold, the unity being an illusion, or that it is a single one, the "manyness" being an illusion. There are, however, schools which maintain that the appearance truly represents reality, that the Universe, in fact, is *both* one and many, or rather one *in* many, and have employed all the resources of the dialectical intellect to show how the apparently irreconcilable concepts of identity and difference can be mated. Such is the school of Objective Idealism (Hegel, Bradley, Bosanquet) in the West, and of Bhedabheda, (of which Bhaskara is the most prominent exponent) in the East.

These schools base their conclusions in part upon the patent facts of human experience. It is, for example, clear that in one sense I am changing from moment to moment, changing both physically and psychologically. So far as my body is concerned, its material stuff is being continually renewed, so that no part of my physical being is the same as it was a year, or even a moment, ago. My mental life is no less a flux of change. My hopes, desires, thoughts, ambitions, the very stuff and texture of my consciousness, are different in every particular from what they were when I was a young man; the young man's were different from the boy's; the boy's from the baby's. Yet there is a sense in which the baby, the boy, the young man and myself are the same person, so that I can truly say, "I am the man who at the age of twenty fell in love, at the age of twelve obtained a prize, and at the age of

three was spanked by his nurse." I am in fact an enduring "one" throughout the "many" different phases which my personality assumes. I am an example of identity in difference.

As I am, so too, according to the Vedanta, or rather according to Bhaskara's interpretation of it, is the Universe, for as Professor Hiriyantha in his Foreword points out, there are many interpretations of the Vedantic doctrine, and that of Bhaskara is far from being orthodox. Yet there is good authority for his view. While emphasising the unity of Being, the Upanisads distinguish Brahman from the individual self on the one hand and from the physical universe on the other. Are we, then, to write these off as illusions? The course seems a drastic one, and, Professor Srinivasachari suggests, there is no justification for it in the sacred writings. What remains then but to assign "equal validity to the two teachings" and hold that "the ultimate reality as taught in the Upanisads will be neither a bare unity nor a mere plurality, but a vital synthesis of both". Hence the doctrine which Bhaskara maintained and Professor Srinivasachari sets out to expound.

His book is divided into three sections. In the first, Bhaskara's interpretation of the concept of identity in difference is shown in its application to the various problems of metaphysics. Applied for example to the problem of wholes and parts, it issues in the view that the whole is "not opposed to the parts but constitutes them". Logically prior to the parts, it expresses and differentiates itself through them, without thereby impairing its wholeness:—

Just as the spider weaves its own web and the banyan seed evolves into a mighty tree, Brahman by virtue of His Infinite energy, differentiates Himself into the manifold without being affected thereby.

In the second part other philosophi-

* *The Philosophy of Bhedabheda*. By P. N. SRINIVASACHARI, M. A. (Srinivasa Varadachari & Co., Madras. Rs. 5.)

cal expressions of the doctrine of Brahman are examined. The third contains criticism and indicates Western parallels. It is this last section to which the Western reader will turn with the greatest interest. Bosanquet is the European philosopher whose thought is most closely akin to that of Bhaskara. Yet there are important differences. Bhaskara's doctrine derives direct from the sacred writings, and reason is employed only to dot the i's and cross the t's of revelation, while Bosanquet proceeds to the same conclusions exclusively by the method of the dialectical reason. Again, while Bhaskara has no respect for the earthly life, and therefore excludes it from the Absolute, Bosanquet places value upon the "riches of human experience including its errors, evils and other imperfections" and concedes them, transcended and transfigured, a place in Reality itself. Both differences are in the highest degree significant of fundamental differences in method and

valuations between Eastern and Western thought.

An admirable book this, and valuable for its chastening effect upon the Western reader, who discovers once more how many of the ideas which he fondly believed to be the original contributions of the West are embodied in the vast corpus of Indian philosophy.

The book is disfigured by a number of misprints. Its usefulness for English readers is also diminished as is often the case with books on Indian philosophy by the failure to translate Indian philosophical terms into their English equivalents. That there are frequently no exact English equivalents I can well believe, but, where this is the case, it is the writer's business to give the nearest equivalent, explaining in what respects it falls short of the precise meaning of the Indian term, instead of belabouring the English reader with a hail of technical words which bemuse without enlightening him.

C. E. M. JOAD

III.—MYSTICISM*

Truth is not intimately associated with the "blurbs" of publishers but, in the case of this book, the publishers' claim that this is "A study of Eastern wisdom which Western minds will appreciate" is a modest statement of fact. Actually, a higher claim is justified.

This book fulfils a double function: it illuminates both ignorance and knowledge. To one knowing nothing of the Upanisads, it will reveal much; to one familiar with the texts, it will reveal more.

As the title proclaims, this book is concerned with Hindu Mysticism in the Upanisads and, before considering its main theme, it is perhaps desirable to state in the simplest terms the essential principle underlying all forms of mysticism. In Carlyle's phrase, most people know God "only by hear-

say". The mystic claims to have met Him. For the mystic, religion is "livingly experienced metaphysic". It is neither a rite nor a refuge. It is a glimpse of Reality.

But in this book, we are concerned with Hindu Mysticism and it is therefore necessary to indicate, however inadequately, the especial quality which seems to differentiate this form of mysticism from others more familiar to Western minds.

It is, perhaps, significant that, in the opening of Chapter I, Professor Sircar states that "self-transcendence is the watchword of the Upanisads and the Vedanta". Significant, because the dominant impression created by the first reading of this book is that the mysticism of the Upanisads is uniquely transcendental. It differs from other forms of mysticism in that the quiet of

* *Hindu Mysticism According to The Upanisads*. By MAHENDRANATH SIRCAR (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., London. 15s.)

transcendence—as taught in the Upanisads—is a state wholly outside the boundaries of finite consciousness. “It is not felt, it is not enjoyed. It is.”

On the broadest possible lines, then, this seems to be the fundamental theme of the book, and it is not surprising therefore that the state which many Western mystics have held to be ultimate felicity—the state of mystic exaltation—is regarded as bondage by the deepest wisdom of the Upanisads. The ultimate is not the cosmic vision by the individual self, it is the cosmic vision by the Cosmic Self. “These texts, it should be remembered, present the absolute truth of identity.”

Owing to space restriction, it has been possible only to suggest, tentatively, the main theme of this book, but attention is particularly invited to the chapters dealing with “Time and Spiritual Life,” “The Five Sheaths,” and

“Rhythm of Life and the States of Consciousness”.

Finally—and this, perhaps, is of particular interest to Western readers—Professor Sircar frequently refers to the belief that Indian systems of mysticism demand a denial of life. According to him, this torturing of life is no part of the teaching of the Upanisads, and is remote from the ideals of the Upanisadic seers. Renunciation is not a cul-de-sac: it is a road to a finer, freer, and fuller life.

The fullness of life dawns suddenly upon receptive souls. It can come to him alone who has the proper attitude; and this attitude is nothing but a silent watch of the soul. Constant watchfulness helps the soul to be receptive to the finest expression of life. This watchful silence unties the knots of our psychic being, and makes it responsive to the soul. It also makes it responsive to the currents of life, revealing its divine orientation. The seeker is reborn. This is the great claim of mysticism.

CLAUDE HOUGHTON.

GANDHIJI

[In leaving behind the soul-enervating field of party-politics Gandhiji very probably will not experience prison-life again. Here are two reviews of recent books—each will enable the reader to understand the other better, completing the study of the great man whose political theories spring from his religion and whose religion is coloured by his political programmes.—EDS.]

I.—POLITICIAN*

“What will you do when you retire from your professional work?” was the question put to an eminent reviewer. “Commence to read the books I have reviewed,” was the reply. While many writers would be forced to admit that their knowledge of the books they had reviewed was of the scantiest, I doubt if the reviewers of this volume would come into this category.

The author has given us a deeply interesting biography, a complete review of Mr. Gandhi's life from the time of his birth to the present day. My first reaction on reading this book was one of anger. The story is unfair, for the author is not content with portraying Mr. Gandhi's life and action

but he seeks to find an ulterior motive for the many grave decisions Mr. Gandhi has been called upon to make. He says:—

I cannot associate myself with the hysterical admiration bestowed upon him by people who are in other ways sane and reasonable. Against certain of his doctrines I rebel with all my heart and with all my mind.

How many of us could subscribe to all Mr. Gandhi's doctrines, how many of us are prepared to carry on the instructions of the Teacher in His Sermon on the Mount? Yet the selflessness of Mr. Gandhi cannot be doubted, and it is this denial of his integrity that in my mind is the weakness of this book. If his was the asceticism

of the moralist who is not an artist, when he ordered the burning of all foreign cloth and committed many priceless treasures to the flames it was because he was seeking to show his followers that human life is of greater importance than beautiful possessions, that the buying of Indian cloth even if artistically less beautiful gives employment to countless millions of starved peasants. The Mahatma does not praise poverty, but as long as starvation is the lot of his people he suffers with them. Mr. Gandhi has achieved the distinction of being the most talked-of man in the world to-day, he has been painted, photographed and written up. Millions have waited breathlessly on his word. Thousands of men and women have faced imprisonment, torture and even death at his command. Yet his greatness lies, not so much in his power over others but in his complete control of self, this very selflessness that the author would deny.

Those who think of Mr. Gandhi only as the Mahatma, the Great Leader, will be interested in this record of his early life, of his difficulty in spelling the word “kettle” when questioned by the Inspector of Schools, of his early interest in the “Untouchables”—that vast army of the outcast about whom Gandhiji wrote on one occasion “untouchability is not a sanction of religion, it is a device of Satan.” At the age of thirteen he was married. “Mohandas Gandhi” we read, “was of course delighted at the prospect of matrimony. It meant a holiday from school, presents, and a little girl to be his constant playmate,” but within a few days of his marriage his mother sent him back to school where he formed an attachment to an older boy. He admired his friend who could run and jump with such athletic grace; he wished to become equally strong and beautiful. This, his friend assured him, was easy; he had only to eat meat. “How would the English have conquered India if they had not been fiendish meat-eaters? How can the Indians expel them from the mother-

land until they themselves have tasted flesh?... The Herculean tempter was slowly subduing Mohandas to his will.” We read that the Gandhi family grew anxious and did their best to end what they believed to be a “wicked” friendship, but Mohandas was obdurate. When he finally tasted meat he was physically sick and spiritually unhappy. For about a year he and his friend met clandestinely to eat meat, but he increased neither in strength nor beauty. As he had a horror of telling lies it became increasingly difficult to conceal his dietary practice from his parents. He finally took a vow not to eat meat again, a vow which he has kept to this day. So strong is his horror of meat-eating he refused to allow beef tea to be given to his wife, though on one occasion she was so ill the doctors said this was the one thing which might save her life.

In 1887 Mohandas paid his first visit to England, where in due course he passed his examinations and was called to the Bar. He returned to India a fully qualified barrister and to the wife whom he had not seen for three years, and if accounts are true the reunion must have been difficult for both of them. “Gandhi was becoming more and more of an ascetic and in married life asceticism is a failure unless it is practised willingly by both parties.” When we learn some years later that Mr. Gandhi after consultation with his friend Mr. West took the vow of chastity and “felt immeasurably happier,” we search in vain for Mrs. Gandhi's views on the matter. If she was consulted the author does not think it of sufficient importance to mention.

On Mr. Gandhi's work in South Africa there are many interesting chapters. The willing relinquishment of his salary, variously estimated at between £3,000 and £6,000 a year, in order to help his less fortunate brethren, his work in India for the Congress Party, and later his negotiations with the Viceroy and British Government, make as thrilling a story as any one could wish to read.

* *The Tragedy of Gandhi*. By GLORNEY BOLTON. (George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 10s. 6d. London.)

Mahatma Gandhi has never looked back and while at one time his leadership of the Untouchables was challenged by Dr. Ambedkar I can vouch as one who was in India during the bitter controversy that in the far away villages, miles from town or railway, it was Gandhi's name that was acclaimed as leader. Outside Bombay few had ever heard the name Ambedkar. It is surprising, therefore, to read that the author says that "Dr. Ambedkar's leadership is actual" while "Mr. Gandhi's leadership is sentimental and assumed".

It would be difficult to refute such a statement in better words than those used by Mr. Bolton himself in closing his story of the life of a very great personality.

He has triumphed and blundered. He has sinned, as a doctor of the Church would have understood sin, as a Greek would have understood "the missing of the mark." But the mark of a saint is not perfection; it is consecration. Who among us is to dispute his claim to the title of Mahatma? He taught his countrymen self-respect. They no longer fear the taunt—the silly taunt—of racial inferiority. He taught them to respect the

individuality of all men, no matter how mean their estate may be. He made himself one with the poorest of the poor. He entered the palaces of kings in the garment worn by millions of India's peasants. So doing, he showed that the peasant with his homely but ancient and deeply rooted philosophy has yet some contribution to make to the wisdom and happiness of his fellow men. With these achievements, it is less easy to speak of the Tragedy of Gandhi, or to bemoan too deeply the fact that at a fateful Conference he had no acceptable solution to offer. It may be that, even if he had not been born, enlightened Hindus would have recognized the sinfulness of condemning millions of men and women to an unjust condition of Untouchability. Evil does not endure. The spirit of man is ever ready to destroy evil, once it is made aware of the existence of evil. Pious Hindus have condoned Untouchability as in the past pious Christians have condoned slavery. But to Mr. Gandhi belongs in ample measure the credit for having undermined the foundations of Untouchability. He will not live to see its complete disappearance; for the evil is deeply rooted. But he has lit the candle which cannot yet be extinguished. Men will forget the details of the Round Table Conference. They will in time—and with the help of the spirit of *Satyagraha*—forget the animosity they have felt towards Englishmen in India.

To have achieved this much is no mean record in the life of one man—and Gandhi still lives.

MONICA WHATELY

II.—PRISONER*

The title of this book is a little misleading. It suggests the singer behind prison-bars rather than a translator whose work has passed through the emending hands of someone else. Mr. Gandhi made a rough translation of Indian devotional poems and hymns for English friends during his imprisonment in Yeravda Jail, Poona, in 1930. The original matter was taken partly from the Upanishads and other Sanskrit Scriptures and partly from the poets of the *Bhakti* school of thought and devotion, particularly those of the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This rough translation has been pre-

pared by Mr. Hoyland for publication in the West. The extent to which he has "worked upon it" cannot be estimated, but he has "thought best to omit certain material, chiefly Indian names and symbolism," has altered some of the phrasing and put the whole into a loose metrical form. This suggests some rather considerable modification and the result makes us wonder whether Mr. Hoyland has not superfluously westernised his material. The English are a practical people and their language is full of concrete imagery. They are very much at home in the world of the five senses, and

even the mystics among them who have felt the thralldom of sense have used a richly coloured language to invoke the Spirit which is beyond all the divisions of the spectrum. It is natural, therefore, that to Western readers much Eastern devotional poetry should by contrast with their own seem colourless and insufficiently defined, though the few who can read Eastern poetry in the original seldom, we think, feel this. But it is, perhaps, inevitable that an English translation of Sanskrit, for example, however sensitively executed, should leave this impression. For the genius of the one language can hardly be accommodated to that of the other. The metaphysical subtlety, the delicate nuances of emphasis and meaning, of Sanskrit elude the texture of English diction, while the very concrete imagery of English is alien to the finer intimations of the Eastern Spirit. For behind the difference in the language there is, of course, a difference in value and in perception. Eastern poets and mystics have been for the most part far more profoundly convinced than their Western brothers of the necessity of transcending all personal definition in their surrender to the indefinable and changeless One. For them, indeed, to abandon the personal was not to abandon the true self, but to discover it through its identity with the Eternal One. Nanak, a fifteenth century poet, included in this volume, wrote,

As is the fragrance in the flower,
As is the likeness in the mirror,
So is God also everywhere at all times :
Search for him, friend, within thyself :
Give heed to what the sages teach,
That God is both within us and beyond ;
Until thou knowest this,
Until thou knowest him who dwelleth
in thyself,
The dark dank mists of self-delusion
Shall cling around thee still.

This English rendering doubtless gives an approximate idea of the original. Yet its inner meaning, if only by the use of the word "God" (which is employed throughout the volume), is a little distorted. For the

word "God" must have for Western readers definitely monotheistic associations. And the strength and the weakness of Western monotheism lie in its too personal emphasis. The Christian critics of the East who dismiss Hinduism as pessimistic pantheism are curiously blind to the destructive as well as constructive egoism inherent in their own dogmatic monotheism. Nor can they see that there is a creative religion of the Spirit which transcends the mental categories of either pantheism or monotheism. It is this religion, grounded in an ordered surrender of the partial self to an Eternal Being unspeakable, unthinkable, the formless Former of all things, which these Indian poets expressed with calm consistency though with varying emphasis. In their belief the Eternal could only speak and think through them, if in their thoughts it remained unspeakable and unthinkable. They could only grow into It by discarding the formal defences of the mundane mind. And it is this mystery of the wholeness which can only be born out of emptiness which is imperfectly communicated in so Westernised a translation as this. Yet those who realise that these hymns and poems do not offer the kind of satisfaction to be got from passionate or elaborate imagery, but that the very chastity of their idiom reflects a spiritual vision which is beyond the strife of opposites, will find that the collection has much to offer them as a basis for meditation. Mr. Gandhi's choice of poets of the *Bhakti* school is distinctive. There are a few of them such as Surdas in whom the devotional impulse is still rather morbidly constrained by a sense of personal sin. But in most of them, as in Kabir, the sense of the Eternal shines with so serene a radiance that they are alight with charity both for all men and towards themselves. Their ardour is clarified by insight, while to the Source of all Being, which is the continual subject-object of their praise and prayer, they dedicate themselves

* *Songs From Prison*: Translations of Indian Lyrics Made in Jail. By M. K. GANDHI. Adapted for the Press by John S. Hoyland. (George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London. 5s. cloth; 3s. 6d. paper.)

in words which reconcile the opposites
that logic would keep apart,—

Thou art in all
And yet—in all thou art not :
Perfect thou art, beyond imagining,

Thou workest secretly, and very wondrously :
Formless thou art, and indefinable,
Master thou art, and servant too. . . .

The Scriptures name thee the Unknowable ;
Yet here thy servants sing thy praise,
For they have known.

HUGH I'A. FAUSSET.

THE YOGA OF THE POET

[L. A. G. Strong's work as poet, novelist, and critic is well known. In this review of the world famous "Q" he quotes, without comment, the view that the poet connects the music within himself with the rhythm of the universe and then wakes "his less sensitive fellows to an apprehension of the harmony beyond and yet within them". In a subsequent issue we will publish an essay on "Poetry and Common Sense" by Mr. Strong himself.—Eds.]

Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch's new collection takes its title from the three addresses with which it opens. To-day, when it is being widely said that the artist must take a back seat, and that there is no room for him in the struggle ahead, this affirmation of the poet's place in the state has a particular value. It would be valuable at any time ; but we conjecture it could never be more sharply needed.

Sir Arthur remains one of the steadiest and most consistent literary personalities of our time. In a turmoil of loud, dogmatic voices his urbane utterance has often been overlooked : yet, when each fashionable outburst dies down, his voice is once more heard, never raised, unhurried, preaching the cause of tolerance and of sane enjoyment. Whatever view be finally taken of "Q's" place as a critic, certain rare virtues must be conceded him. For him, intellect is the whole man expressed in judgment. He actively enjoys literature, a faculty which at once puts him ahead of the majority of contemporary critics. He is catholic in his enjoyment, and widely tolerant. Finally, this tolerance is not the result of loose and vague standards of criticism, but of a critical apparatus so fundamental and humane that no benevolence is needed to stretch it. His practice is a notable corrective to that too prevalent state of mind which can-

not believe anyone to be in earnest about a belief unless he is perpetually losing his temper.

That Sir Arthur's tolerance is not based upon any compromise with belief is shown in the first paper, *The Poet as Citizen*. Here from the start he affirms his faith in the poet's calling. "It is in art," he quotes from E. S. Dallas, "that the history of the world is enshrined, almost in art alone that the far past survives": and, from Sir William Ridgeway, "Religions pass, theogonies have their day and fashion, but the Muse abides." Poetry, however, is more than the amber in which the spirit of the past is enshrined. It has a contemporary function. In the examination of its claim to greatness, Sir Arthur, himself a poet, will have no unsupported *ex parte* statements:—

The poets themselves, of course, have no doubt whatever concerning the value, present and permanent, of their wares ; and we must listen to them with due reverence, albeit with such reasonable caution as we should use in ordinary life towards persons who write their own testimonials ; as again we must be careful not to confuse their claims for poetry with their claims for themselves.

Far from being a mere dreamer, the poet has an unusually acute insight into the realities of contemporary life. "[Israel's] poets were consciously, intensively, racial : and Israel certainly did not stone the prophets because they wrote bad verse, or because they wrote

good verse, but because what they wrote was politically true and, to the unwise contemporary mob of Israel, politically exasperating."

After warning his readers not to look in poetry for tribal patriotism, still less for any direct ethical doctrine, he advances his own theory, which is in origin Platonic.

Small specks as we are, we belong to the universe, and carry, almost all our time quite unconsciously, its rhythm within us. Indeed as a rule we are conscious of it only when we fall ill, when the heart beats irregularly, when the temperature flies up. But, over and above this corresponding physical rhythm, man has a native emotional impulse to merge himself in the greater harmony and be one with it . . . If by language he can connect the music within himself with the great rhythm, he has disciplined himself to accord, and at the same time to feel pleasurably that he is in accord, with his Creator's purpose.

That I suggest is where the beneficent and proper function of poetry "comes in". That is why to the Greeks Apollo was equally and at once the god of poetry and the god of medicine ; and in that I find, for my part, the duty of the poet as a citizen : by awaking his less sensitive fellows to an apprehension of the harmony beyond and yet within them

The paper ends with certain warnings and a plea for liberty. Next comes *First Aid in Criticising*, a series of addresses. Of these he says:—

The title . . . advertises four of these as elementary : and so of purpose they were. Few can admire more than I the hard thinking put into their work by some (and notably here in Cambridge) of the new race of "psychological" critics, as I may call them ; or hope more of their earnest sincerity. But the vocabulary of their science is not yet determined : they invent new words and locutions as they press along, and in such haste that B may too easily mistake what A precisely means by this or

that abstract term, even if A shall have fixed it to his own mental satisfaction. Further, this concentration on Aesthetic tends more and more of late to distract the attention from the essential in any given work to let curiosity play upon (a) the reader, his "resilience" or "awareness" or "sense of immediacy": which at once transfers concern from the thing itself to So-and-So's *ego* and—there being so many of us in the world and our occasions so various—dissipates study : or (b) upon the private life of the author ; e.g. of Wordsworth, not upon what he expressly wrote for our advantage in *The Prelude* but upon what someone guesses he set out to conceal.

For these reasons it seemed opportune to remind a youthful audience of some methods which, though elementary, have been observed by critics admittedly not puerile.

The addresses admirably fulfil their object. They are sane, persuasive, humorous, and genially learned. It would be possible here and there to quarrel with the argument. In *The Handicap of Poetry*, for instance, a comparison is made between Poetry and Painting, which is based on a too easy assumption about the latter, and an apparent tendency to forget that the effect of the former depends precisely upon the methods by which we apprehend it. The fact that poetry is compelled to use symbols is not a limitation, but a strength. Elsewhere, it is possible perhaps to feel that Sir Arthur makes too many gestures to conciliate the indifferent listener : but this, if a fault, is a generous one. A just tribute to the writing of Somerville and Ross characteristically concludes the book. If the phrase "a man of letters" has any meaning nowadays, Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch is amply qualified to wear it.

L. A. G. STRONG

Confucianism and Modern China. The Lewis Fry Memorial Lectures 1933-34, delivered at Bristol University. By REGINALD F. JOHNSTON. (Victor Gollancz, Ltd., London. 8s. 6d.)

Since the Chinese revolution of 1911 far-reaching changes have been taking place throughout the length and breadth of China. Old customs and

beliefs are going by the board, and even the time-honoured family system is crumbling. Ancestor-worship is still very generally practised, but the progressive weakening of the family tie makes it doubtful whether even this mainstay of Chinese civilization can long continue to survive. Though not an essential part of Confucianism,

**The Poet as Citizen, and other Papers.* By SIR ARTHUR QUILLER-COUCH (Cambridge Press, 9s.)

ancestor-worship is closely connected with it in the popular mind, and the question now arises whether Confucianism has not outlived its usefulness, and may not have to be thrown off like a worn-out garment. It had been the State religion of the Manchus, and that was enough to discredit it in the eyes of the early revolutionaries, whose zeal led them hastily to assume that there was nothing valuable in the Confucian system except its antiquity. The aim of Sir Reginald Johnston's book is to show that its tenets are of such an elevated nature and so intimately bound up with the national life that they could not be discarded without grave detriment to the State. Whether or no it is entitled to be called a religion, "it possesses two characteristics which most of us would agree are essential to religion—namely, a sound and workable system of ethics and an acknowledgment of the existence of a divine order." Sir Reginald has no difficulty in proving the excellence of Confucian ethics, even out of the mouth of a missionary who was by no means an indiscriminating admirer of things Chinese; but he seems to admit that Confucius may have laid excessive emphasis on filial piety. This criticism is often heard, but it is not really supported by the facts. The so-called "Classic of Filial Piety," on which the charge is usually based, was a comparatively late production and does not represent the teaching of the Master himself. Any one who has the curiosity to look up the *Lun Yü* or authentic Sayings will be surprised, I think, to find how little there is on the subject. It may be noted, by the way, that the famous saying, "If you do not know about life, what can you know about death?" occurs in the *Lun Yü* and not, as the author says, in the *Chia Yü* (Family Sayings), which is also a late and dubious compilation.

Of the fourteen texts chosen by the present Prime Minister of Manchuria to serve as a summary of Confucian ethics, which form a prelude to this book, all but one are taken

from the same source. The many difficulties they offer to the translator are not always successfully surmounted. Thus, in the third passage, translated "The gentleman is slow of speech, resolute in action," the word *min* is "prompt" rather than "resolute," which does not provide the necessary antithesis. No. 5 is inaccurately rendered "Uprightness belongs to man by virtue of his birth; if he loses that, he is in peril." Actually, the Chinese text says that "if a man loses his natural goodness and yet lives, he is lucky to escape". In No. 8, "the maintenance of a balance between familiarity and reserve" is a cumbrous rendering of *kung*, which simply means courtesy or respect. Finally, in No. 9 there reappears once more Legge's old mistranslation of *shu* as "reciprocity," which I thought I had demolished for good and all nearly thirty years ago. It may be defined as the art, or practical application, of *jen*: disinterested goodness towards one's fellowmen.

Sir Reginald's main strength lies in his reasoning power and the trenchant quality of his arguments, of which he gave so many examples in his earlier book, *An Appeal to Christendom concerning Christian Missions*. Here again his opponents come in for some shrewd knocks, though I cannot help thinking he is unduly kind to the well-known Jesuit writer Père Léon Wieger, whom he calls "one of the wisest and best-equipped students of modern China". Père Wieger is notorious, even among missionaries, as a harsh and intolerant critic of the Chinese and their institutions. A specimen of his style will be found on page 251 of this very book: "Prise en masse, la classe lettrée est inconvertissable, à cause de ses vices honteux, de sa morgue stupide, et de son indifférence blasée." This is surely the language of petty spite, not of wisdom.

I also have a little quarrel with Sir Reginald himself. While defending with justifiable vigour Chinese practices relating to the ancestral cult,

why should he go out of his way to sneer at Western spiritualism, and speculate whether a wooden tablet may not be as effective as "a tea-table or a heart-shaped board, or a professional medium, in attracting the spirits of the departed"? I would remind him that Confucius, agnostic as he is believed to have been, held a high opinion of mediums (called *wu* in ancient China); for we are told that

he approved the saying: "A man without constancy will make neither a medium nor a doctor."

The book as a whole may be thoroughly recommended as a well-written and scholarly production. The chapters are all fully documented, and the numerous works, both Chinese and foreign, quoted or referred to in the notes indicate a wide range of reading.

LIONEL GILES

Liberty To-day, A New Defence of Liberty and Democracy. By C. E. M. JOAD (C. A. Watts. & Co., London 2s. 6d.)

Twenty years ago it seemed safe to assume that the only avowed advocate of the principle of intolerance was the Church of Rome. That august body, true to its medieval tradition taught that intolerance was the duty of every self-respecting Catholic. It promoted to the rank of Cardinal a priest who supported the infallibility of the Pope and who vindicated the Church's sacred right to persecute, and by means of its Index of Prohibited Books and other ways it sought to suppress the opinions of its opponents.

Then in 1917 a new orientation was suddenly given to the principle of intolerance. The Russian revolution placed the Bolsheviks in power and like all true fanatics they promptly proscribed all opinions but their own. They established a strict censorship of the Press and set up their own Index of Prohibited Books. Nothing but Communist views were permitted to be published and Catholic priests were shot for not recognizing the infallibility of Marx and Lenin. The ironical spectacle was witnessed of a Pope protesting against persecution.

Yet a few years more and a fresh extension was given to the principle of intolerance. The Fascists gained control in Italy and proceeded to punish everybody who refused to accept the pure goal of Fascism. "A rising faith," said Signor Mussolini, "must

needs be intolerant." Accordingly opposition newspapers were attacked, their premises and property "scientifically destroyed," their editors beaten, dosed with castor-oil, banished or murdered, until in Mussolini's words: "The body of Liberty was dead and her corpse putrescent."

Germany was the next country to exhibit the same symptoms. Triumphant Hitlerism made short work of a hostile Press. Its spokesman, Dr. Goebbels, has expressly denied the right of anyone to criticize the Government. Literature, art and education have been forced to turn fascist or to disappear. Herr Hitler has undergone a process of deification. "Hitler is lonely," says Dr. Frank, "so is God; Hitler is like God." In a few months, Germany has wiped out the gains of centuries and we are back in the days of the Roman Empire with a deified emperor, a Pretorian guard of S. S. troopers, and the wholesale murder of possible rivals.

The dangers which beset liberty throughout the world by reason of this sudden revival of the principle and practice of intolerance have now been vividly set out by Mr. C. E. M. Joad in this well-written book. Here will be found fully and fairly stated the arguments employed against liberty and democracy, and a clear and temperate statement of the case in their favour. Mr. Joad shows how in England the slowness of parliamentary methods, the growing complexity of modern society and the general unsettlement of religi-

ous and other opinions have combined to produce impatience with democracy. The Socialists and Communists are disinclined to await the gradual attainment of their objects by constitutional means and their left wing partisans preach class-war and revolution. These doctrines have been followed by their natural result, and a Fascist party is on foot ready to repel violence by violence. If such an atmosphere prevails, a clash would mean destructive civil war and a worse ruin of civilization than in Russia.

To both parties Mr. Joad offers thoughtful and cogent reasons in favour of liberty and democracy. Liberty, he shows, is essential to human progress and an age of absolutism has usually been one of stagnation. When democracy is replaced by a dictatorship, liberty disappears, for a dictator is always hostile to liberty and generally distrustful of education. His ideal is one of unity and submission, and to promote this state of mind he relies not on reason but on sentiment. One of the most powerful of sentiments is

patriotism. Hence the praise of nationality by both Hitler and Mussolini, the violent anti-Semitism in Germany and the eulogy of war both by German and Italian Fascists. Nothing unifies sentiment and distracts attention from domestic blunders better than war. Even the most benevolent dictator makes mistakes, but it is difficult for him to retrace his steps without loss of prestige, so he drifts into a policy of repression. The modern exaltation of the State is based on a fallacy; the State exists for the citizen, not the citizen for the State, and no one knows where the shoe pinches except the man who wears it. We should try to remedy the defects in our parliamentary machine, but to scrap it for some form of dictatorship would be a disastrous error. The book is temperate and timely, and if undue prominence is given to occurrences in Germany and too little to similar events in Italy and Russia, that is because the latter tend to be forgotten while Germany's offences are fresh in the memories of all men.

A. G. CARDEW

Zoroastrianism. By JOHN W. WATERHOUSE, B. A., B. D. (Great Religions of the East Series. The Epworth Press, London. 2s. 6d.)

We are afraid no one will be the better or the wiser for reading this latest addition to the "Great Religions of the East" Series. The various volumes are written by Christian clergymen apparently with the object of damning with faint praise non-Christian religions. The present volume, for instance, along with some complimentary things about Zoroaster, contains such balderdash as this:—

Zoroaster had not pondered sufficiently long and deeply over the ultimate purposes of life. (pp. 34-35.)

In his desire to attribute all things to Ahura, Zoroaster had taken a dangerous step in postulating that the deity was limited by his own evil principle. (p. 61)

Many such statements throw an

interesting light on the nature of the author's study of the Zoroastrian religion.

The statement on p. 114 that "there is to-day little dispute in the Parsi community, which abides by the decisions of the Dasturs" will provoke laughter among Parsis, for the Dasturs (*i. e.*, priests) have little influence on educated and cultured Parsis, who have lost faith in the priests whose main function is the performance of rites and ceremonies.

It is now increasingly recognized that the various orthodox religions are hopelessly ill-suited for the requirements of this age. At such a time pedantic, pretentious and ill-informed "studies" of individual religions—of which this book is an illustration—serve no useful purpose.

J. P. W.

Coleridge: Studies by Several Hands on the Hundredth Anniversary of his Death. Edited by EDMUND BLUNDEN AND EARL LESLIE GRIGGS. (Constable & Co. Ltd., LONDON. 10s. 6d.)

Volumes deliberately "centenary" prove too often to be unappetizing fare,—much dough and little individuality; or they are obviously forced, produced to order because it is the 100th anniversary of so-and-so's death, and so-and-so has a name famous enough to sell a centenary volume. This book, however, in which Coleridge is so rightly honoured, is different; and indeed might be set up as an example of what a volume on such an occasion should be. Perhaps it is best described as a Coleridge Scrap Book of material for future biographers to fill in some of the blank spaces in the poet's recorded life, thoughts, and bibliography.

The "Several Hands" have done well, with the possible exception of that which gives us the chapter "Gems of Purest Ray," which reads as if it were written with one eye on the lower classes of an elementary school. Probably what will appeal to the widest circle is the contribution from the Rev. G. H. B. Coleridge of chapters written by his father on Coleridge's life during the period 1796 to 1800. These chapters are from an unfinished "Life," and I think none will read them and not agree with the statement of the author's son that, "It is not filial piety alone which leads me to affirm that no successor of his will be able to write such a life of S. T. C. as his would have been." The other Scraps may not have the wide interest of this first one, but they are written with sincerity, and help us to understand the achievement of Coleridge against the background of his life. Mr. Edmund Blunden writes on Coleridge's school days at Christ's Hospital; Mr. E. L. Griggs contributes a letter from Sara Coleridge about her father's death; and Mr. A. L. Eagleton clears up the mystery of "Wordsworth, Coleridge and the Spy".

Mr. Beeley discusses his political thoughts; and Professor Muirhead, in an essay, "Metaphysician or Mystic?", claims for Coleridge's philosophy, "whatever its defect in detail, that it is in a true sense metaphysical rather than mystical".

Altogether this is an attractive and instructive book about one of whose life it has ever been a difficult task to write with understanding; for his recorded lapses and infirmities, his quarrellings with friends, his continual war with himself, seem to show so different a man from the lovable Coleridge portrayed by his contemporaries: by people such as Charles Lamb, Dorothy Wordsworth, Sarah Hutchinson, whose judgments we must surely accept. By many he was honoured in his lifetime near to "this side idolatry," and he should be held in honour still, this man whose ancestors were humble Devon peasants; this poet who held the true end of poetry to be to give pleasure; this critic, with his subtlety of psychological comment; and this thinker who turned for his philosophy away from the realism of his century to a spiritual and religious interpretation of life.

A man of dreams and self-deception he may have been, but he had that kind of intuition which marks him as a true prophet. Certainly he yielded his will to laudanum and opium, and allowed those drugs to fool him in many ways; but yet from his dream-spun, sensitive imagination sprang the unquenchable flames of "The Ancient Mariner," "Christabel," and "Kubla Khan". He knew his weakness, and out of that knowledge flowered his wonderful sympathy and understanding for the weaknesses of others.

But wherefore, wherefore fall on me?
To be beloved is all I need,
And whom I love, I love indeed.

So he wrote, and so it is best to remember him: and in this book is enshrined much to quicken that memory.

A. R. UBSDELL.

The Katha Upanishad. By J. N. RAWSON (Oxford University Press, London. 12s. 6d.)

This edition of the *Katha Upanishad* consists of (1) an Introduction (rather three Introductions), (2) the text of the Upanishad in Devanagari, (3) a transliteration of the text, (4) a metrical English translation, (5) an English Commentary, (6) Notes of various kinds and (7) Appendices. And yet we are told that the book is incomplete. It seems the author's original intention was to write two concluding chapters—one on the doctrine of God in the *Katha Upanishad* and the other on the whole theistic movement initiated by the *Katha*. But as the whole matter could not be compressed into two chapters it has been withheld for the present. The author says:—

This book therefore remains a preliminary study in the Hindu doctrine of God gathering material which we hope later to develop in more systematic form.

It may be said at once that Mr. Rawson has done his work with amazing thoroughness. He has apparently read all the modern literature on the subject and has studied the classical commentaries of the Hindu Acharyas. He freely quotes from Sankara's Commentary and states the great philosopher's views even when he rejects them as unwarranted by the text. He gives parallel passages not only from the other Upanishads and the *Gita* but also occasionally from Christian gospels and English poets. Principal Dasgupta rightly says of the book in a note on the dust-cover that "it impartially supplies the Sanskrit student with all the material needed for forming an independent judgment on the interpretation proposed."

But one wonders whether all this formidable critical apparatus does not really choke the life of the original poem and whether the translator was wise in choosing a loose metrical form for his translation instead of simple and terse prose. And above all one doubts whether anything is gained by his attempt to prove that the *Katha Upanishad*

is in the line of an imaginary theistic development, "distinguishing more clearly between the Akshara and the Purusha, definitely subordinating the impersonal to the personal"—a development which reached its culmination in the *Gita*. There is no doubt that one of the sources of the *Gita* is the *Katha Upanishad*. On this subject, it may not be out of place to say that the present reviewer has written a small book to which Mr. Rawson pays a handsome compliment on page 48. But it is well known that the Upanishads are not confined to any one philosophical or theological system. Many a system has grown later out of the great spiritual intuitions of the Rishis. Nor does any Upanishad remain constant on a single plane of experience. Mr. Rawson himself observes:—

In particular, the *Katha Upanishad*, though quoting in its second adhyaya from the *Brihad-aranyaka*, and possibly affected in parts by the idealistic monism of Yajñavalkya, is on the whole distinctly theistic.

The fact is that the Upanishadic thought springing from the sacrificial religion of the Brahmanas sweeps within its embrace almost all phases of religious experience and reaches its climax in the absolutism of a Yajñavalkya. There is therefore no hard and fast line anywhere between theism and absolutism in the Upanishads, and least of all is there felt any opposition between the two modes of experience. Even in such an avowedly theistic scripture as the *Gita* there are many expressions and passages that point to absolutism. And even in the teaching of Yajñavalkya, that prince of absolutists, there are many theistic passages. And Sankara, the unwearied apostle of metaphysical monism, was also a man of faith and a passionate writer of hymns. It is as futile to try to explain away the absolutist passages in the Upanishads and the *Gita* as to explain away the theistic passages. Both of them are there and sometimes side by side; and a great majority of Hindus believe that theism with its worship of a personal Iswara is a stepping stone

to absolutism with its absorption into the supra-personal Brahman.

The aim of the Christian missionaries in India has latterly been to isolate the elements of theism in Hindu scriptures and bestow on them their liberal patronage and point to their culmination in Jesus Christ. Christianity is thus argued to be the crown of Hinduism. Mr. Rawson's attempt is in the direct line of this new development in missionary tactics beginning with his teacher, the late Dr. Farquhar. For he says in the Introduction:—

The characteristic teachings of the *Katha Upanishad* are just as essential in Christianity and nowhere have they been so powerfully set forth as by Jesus himself followed by St. John and St. Paul. Christian theology also gave in a more developed form the answer of the *Katha* regarding the relation between man and God, though with an even more radical recognition of the essential sin of ego-centrism and an attempt, in the doctrine of atonement, to set forth the historic operation of Divine Grace to overcome it.

We Do Not Die. By SHAW DESMOND, (Arthur Barker Ltd., London, 8s. 6d.)

The value of this book lies in the unconscious picture that it gives of the effect of spiritualistic activities on the mind. The very style reproduces perfectly the heterogeneous character of a spiritualistic séance, its emotional atmosphere, and its continually changing response to different stimuli. The brief chapters, the short flitting sentences, loose inaccuracies, contradictions and repetitions, all help the impression. So do the sudden changes from high-flown "gemmed" speech to slang, and the intermingling of sensational journalese with fragmentary sayings that are excellent.

The book is said to contain daring and illuminating speculations. In reality it reproduces the explanations and theories absorbed by the author from the various movements with which he has come in contact. For despite many

And how far his missionary bias takes the author astray can be seen from the following statement:—

We repeat that the central doctrine of the Upanishads "This Ātman is that Brahman" means that self-consciousness, our awareness of our own inner selves, is a revelation of the nature of Brahman,—the supreme adorable reality, in that He too is essentially Ātman,—the supreme Self. But this is different from saying, as Yajñavalkya and Sankara do, that there is only one knowing Self who is both subject and object, for that involves that the Self is unknowable that the Self-knowledge which the Upanishads teach must above all be sought, is really unattainable.

The authors of the Upanishadic Mahavakyas, we are afraid, would turn in their graves if they knew that their great sayings about the identity of Ātman and Brahman were interpreted to mean only the personality of God; and so would Yajñavalkya and Sankara if they knew that their monism was interpreted to mean only agnosticism.

D. S. SARMA

scathing references to "the occult jargon and... the woolly terminology and grandiloquent thinking of the multitudinous 'osophist' sects who assume a cinch on Satan—if not on God," the author incorporates a very large proportion of the pseudo-theosophical ideas, and even terminology, into his book. He has obviously recognized that the original spiritualistic conception could not explain all the facts. That is so far to the good, but the pseudo-theosophical teachings are themselves perversions of the original truths, and this book merely twists them still a little further into materialism.

Nevertheless the reader will find it an interesting psychological study, *provided* he has sufficient knowledge of the distinction between *nous* and *psyche*, the "individuality" and the "personality," for that knowledge alone will give him a sound basis for judgment.

WINEFRED WHITEMAN

Medicine and Mysticism. By R. O. MOON, M. D., F. R. C. P. (Longmans, Green & Co., Ltd., London. 2s. 6d.)

It is an indication of coming enlightenment in the conservative profession of medicine, that so many of its more successful practitioners are now willing to admit with Dr. Moon, that "No one can shut off the body and the soul in water-tight compartments." So qualified a statement with regard to something that should be obvious need not provoke our scorn, even when it is elaborated by the further submission that "he whose main business is to deal with the weakness and affections of the body must of necessity have his attention drawn at times to the soul and . . . the relation subsisting between the soul and the body." For, hesitating, almost apologetic as this suggestion undoubtedly is, it provides an encouraging sign that in time the realisation of the intimate relations existing between the psyche and the grosser visible organism, may penetrate even into the close corporation of the British Medical Council.

Dr. Moon's little essay, it is under 10,000 words, deals almost exclusively with those older physicians who combined the practice of medicine with mystical or semi-mystical beliefs. The test in this connection relies upon the criterion of unity. "Periods of philosophic dualism," says Dr. Moon, "can never be very favourable to medicine," leading inevitably, as he points out to the making of a "sharp division . . . between the body and soul". But it is probable that none of the historical figures he adduces, with the possible exception of Paracelsus, had a steady conception of matter as a temporary expression of spirit, as being "visible movement," an ephemeral presentation on the spatial, temporal plane of the eternal mind. "Such stuff as dreams are made on." Nor, whatever Dr. Moon's own beliefs may be, can we

conceivably imagine the medical profession in Europe basing their practice on such an assumption. Their training develops inevitably the view of the bodily organism as an intensely complicated machine. They see it thus on the dissecting table, and come to regard it, in the first place, as an arrangement of differentiated cells, adapted to respond to the motive power we call "life" in much the same way as the parts of a locomotive respond to the motive power of electricity. The early practitioners here cited, such as Van Helmont, Galen, or G. E. Stahl,—the last-named came so near the truth as to maintain that "every movement is a non-material and spiritual act"—were saved the initial prejudices inevitably arising from the physiological study of dead bodies, but the dominating age of science regarded all their teachings as the outcome of ignorance and superstition. Science in fact came with a sudden flood of immense energy to teach that no knowledge was valid unless it were founded on, or could be proved by, material experiment, and under that influence the study of medicine tended increasingly to become nothing more than a biochemical theory, with the surgeon as a master mechanic.

But now the age of "Science," as usually defined, is near its end. In medicine, psycho-analysis and other accepted forms of psycho-therapy are based on the belief that functional and even perhaps organic disorders derive from what Paracelsus would have called "the soul". And what scope must be allowed for those cures we speak of as miraculous, if the scientific world is forced to accept the pronouncement of that inspired and highly respected physicist Neils Bohr, who in his recently translated work affirms that if physicists continue to have their theories on spatial, temporal observations they must abandon the principle of mechanical causation.

J. D. BERESFORD.

Transactions of the Bose Research Institute Calcutta. Vol. VIII, Edited by SIR JAGADIS CHUNDER BOSE, (Longmans, Green & Co., Ltd., London. 21s.)

The *Transactions of the Bose Research Institute*, Calcutta, have already won a high opinion in the world of science, and under the ægis of the learned Editor, Sir Jagadis Chunder Bose, have come to be regarded as among the weightier of the many scientific journals. In the present volume, covering the period 1932-1933, the biological and physical researches carried out at the Institute are fully described, while a short introduction by the Editor draws attention to the chief points of importance. Perhaps the principal impression derived from reading the fourteen articles here given is the freshness of outlook that characterizes them. Research tends to run on stereotyped lines, and while progress is admittedly and indeed obviously so made, the history of science shows us very plainly that the great leaps in advance were generally taken by those men who saw old facts in a new light. For this reason, the participation of men of different races in all kinds of scientific research is very much to be desired, and the establishment of research centres in which intellects of varying moulds may be directed upon the innumerable problems of Nature, seems to be a necessity for rapid—and certainly for fundamental—discovery.

As an example of the originality of ideas manifested in this volume, we may select an experiment from Sir J. C. Bose's own paper on *The Possibility of Differential Effects on Certain Fishes by Water Disturbance and by Vegetable Extracts*. The problem that gave rise to the investigation is as follows: "For the supply of edible fishes, the ponds in Bengal are usually stocked with Rohit (*Rohita bengalensis*), Mrigal (*Cirrhitina mrigal*), and Katla (*Catla buchannani*), for which there is a great demand. Of these the rate of growth in Katla is considerably quicker, hence it is more profitable to collect them before the others for the market. A

question arises: How are these particular fishes to be preferentially caught in the net?" Sir Jagadis refers to the belief, prevalent among fishermen, that while the fishes in general are frightened away by the throwing of the stones or earth into the pond, the Katla are less affected than the others. The fishermen therefore throw clumps of earth into the water, and then cast a circular net over the centre of disturbance. Now, while the average reader of such a practice would probably regard the alleged habit of the Katla as apocryphal or merely queer, Sir Jagadis sees at once that the matter may be investigated scientifically. He chose a large aquarium containing a considerable number of different varieties of fish, sank in it an electric bell enclosed in a glass trough, and proceeded to observe the effects upon the fish of ringing the bell at intervals. The results were negative, since the fish were apparently neither attracted towards, nor frightened away from, the source of sound; but the mark of the true man of science lay in perceiving that here was a matter that could be subjected to the test of experiment. In point of fact, further experiments give support to the view that, while the actual sound of a heavy body being thrown into water may be unperceived by fish of all kinds, the disturbance of the water so produced has less effect on Katla than on the species with which it is normally associated.

Among the other papers, that of Guru Prasanna Das (on the effect of drugs on the rhythmic tissues of animal and plant) is of importance as showing that certain drugs, very different in source and composition, induce effects that are essentially similar on the pulsatory activity of the heart of the frog and on that of a plant leaflet. Such investigations, though still in their initial state, are clearly of great potential value as likely to throw light on general vital activities. It would, however, be invidious to select one paper for detailed consideration and to omit the others, since all are of the same

high standard and represent real contributions to the advancement of science. We congratulate the Editor and the contributors on their work, and are sure that we speak for all scientific workers when we express the hope

that the Bose Institute may continue to flourish, and that many other similar institutes may be established; for thus India may play her essential part in the interpretation of natural phenomena.

E. J. HOLMYARD

Middleton Murry: A Study in Excellent Normality. BY RAYNER HEPPENSTALL. (Jonathan Cape, London. 5s.)

I have long believed Mr. J. Middleton Murry to be, in the field of essential human (that is, mental and spiritual) development, one of the significant figures of our time, at any rate in and for the West. Mr. Heppenstall holds the same belief, but goes beyond faith to works. In this brief volume of succinct summary he seeks—and I think with absolute success—to show Mr. Murry's importance by bringing all his work within a single focus, demonstrating its unity and declaring its nature, and by setting it against a background of contemporary intellectualism. The latter, in a clear, hard, unequivocal but not unfair analysis, is revealed as no better than a tissue of deficiencies, a totally inadequate attempt to rebuild the medieval synthesis of Intelligence and Faith in a world which has "lost the capacity for Faith in that sense," leading in direct consequence to the endeavour to establish Intellect as total dictator. Against this effort Mr. Murry stands in absolute opposition, as a man who in his own deepest experience has "pressed to intolerable conclusiveness the operations of the intellect" and in doing so has perceived "intellect's final impotence," a man who has broken through the limitations of the intellect and found a satisfying knowledge and faith within his total (feeling as well as thinking) being.

If the Faith was born comparatively suddenly, the knowledge was formulated slowly over a period of years and a number of books, self-discovery passing from phase to phase, beginning in simple affirmation of life's ineradicable value, and ending as theory in his book *God* and as practice in a politically active Ethical Communism, both in fact declarations of the organic, dynamic nature of being. Mr. Heppenstall traces this progress with a firm grasp of the essentials of the matter. His book is not the final word on Mr. Murry, but neither does it attempt to be; it appears conceived rather as a tool addressed to the immediate intellectual situation in England to-day. (But not in England only; by implication wherever in the world modern intellectualism spreads its destructive canker.) Some readers may deem its own manner somewhat touched with intellectualism, and they will not be wholly mistaken. Others, less justifiably, may revolt from the bare statement that in Mr. Murry's view "it has to be seen that the human-spiritual is an extension of the purely animal"; yet properly understood, as Mr. Heppenstall himself suggests on the following page, this is not a denial of spirit but rather its wider liberation.

Even those who already know Mr. Murry's work will find clarification in this outline plan. To all others it should serve as excellent introduction. Not to know Mr. Murry's work to-day is to be not merely ignorant but *vitaly* ignorant.

GEOFFREY WEST

Nature and Life. By A. N. WHITEHEAD. (Cambridge University Press. 3s. 6d.)

As it is given in his own words this little book is the best introduction to Whitehead's conception of Nature, which, as expounded in his previous works, has baffled and discouraged many students of philosophy who have tried to understand it. It aims at showing that Nature and Life, detached from each other, are vicious abstractions, and that Nature is not opposed to human values.

The book comprises two lectures delivered at the University of Chicago in October 1933. The first is a criticism of the static conception of Nature, which views it as an aggregate of bits of matter existing in empty space. Ordinary crude sense takes the world as sense-perception presents it to be true. The result is the Hume-Newtonian situation in which Nature, conceived as dead, could furnish no reasons. For "all ultimate reasons are in terms of aim at value. A dead Nature aims at nothing" (p. 24). The situation is a *reductio ad absurdum*, and "should not be accepted as the basis for philosophic speculation" (p. 25). "For the modern view, process, activity, change, are matters of fact" (p. 48).

Yet, Nature conceived as mere activity is also an abstraction. For the question arises: "Activity for what, producing what, activity involving what?" (p. 49). And the answer leads to the second lecture, which shows that the content of this activity is supplied by life and mind. "The characteristics of life are absolute self-enjoyment, creative activity, and aim" (p. 62). The activity of Nature is activity for self-enjoyment, it is creative activity, it is activity involving aim. Yet life is not mind, but lies below its level. The latter, that is, "conceptual experience" is the "entertainment of possibilities for the ideal realisation in abstraction from any sheer physical realization" (p. 92). There is no

sharp division between Nature and mind; mind is part of Nature, and is operative in its further advance (p. 71).

This view of Nature as living is not new to philosophy, though it is a very recent achievement of scientific thought. One may well compare it to the philosophy of Nature of Schelling, and its subsequent developments. And it is a welcome sign for humanism that science, which once was so opposed to it, has begun to be humanistic. And in a way Prof. Whitehead's philosophy should prove to be more satisfactory than even Hegel's, in that the former recognises the importance of emotion or feeling in grasping individuality and value. Prof. Whitehead admits even in the earliest of his chief philosophical works, *Science and the Modern World*, (p. 211), that it is impossible to complete the description of an actual occasion by means of concepts. Here one with an Eastern outlook would ask: Does not this admission conflict with Whitehead's idea of "prehension"? Does not the conception of a whole as a "concretion of elements" amount to explaining the higher in terms of the lower? What is the relation between the intuitive or emotional grasp of the individuality of the whole and the understanding of it as a "concretion" or "prehension"? If we explain the higher in terms of the lower, we certainly lose the individuality of the higher. Yet this defect is not peculiar to Prof. Whitehead's philosophy, but lies in the very idea that philosophy is an attempt at systematisation of experience, and that its sole aim is to furnish a synoptic view of the Universe. It is inherent in the very intellectualism of the West.

In spite of this difference of outlook, the book can be strongly recommended to every thoughtful man even of the East whose faith in human values has been badly shaken by the impact of Western intellectualism. A careful reading of it will create a doubt of his very doubt on them.

P. T. RAJU

Adam's Ancestors. By L.S.B. LEAKEY, M. A., PH. D., (Methuen and Co., Ltd. London. 7s. 6d.)

Dr. L. S. B. Leakey's name will be well known to all readers of THE ARYAN PATH as the discoverer of those human remains in East Africa which have established beyond cavil or dispute the fact that men of our own type existed vastly further back in time than orthodox anthropologists have hitherto allowed. Less than four years ago the prevailing opinion was voiced by Sir Arthur Keith when he stated his conviction that modern man (*Homo Sapiens*) was a comparatively recent evolutionary product, whose earliest activities, in Europe at least, belonged to the Aurignacian period of the late Pleistocene. Sir Arthur attributed all the earlier stone-age cultures to the Neanderthal and other even more primitive types of humanity, while he set aside such discoveries as that of the Galley-Hill skeleton, which seemed to prove the great antiquity of *Homo Sapiens*, as being unproven and intrinsically improbable.

But Dr. Leakey's finds have altered the whole situation. The Kanjera skulls and the Kanam jaw afford incontrovertible proof that our race is at least as old as the oldest of those chinless, heavy-browed races—Neanderthal, Pekin, Rhodesian—which have long since disappeared from the world.

In *Adam's Ancestors*, Dr. Leakey describes in a very clear and interesting manner the present state of our knowledge of ancient man and his works. His chapters on flint industries are peculiarly informative, and those who have carelessly thought of flint implements as being the crude products of rough and unskilled "savages" will be surprised to learn from the true explanations given by Dr. Leakey that considerable skill is required to make even the ruder types, while the manufacture of the more elaborate calls for the most delicate workmanship and for a refined technique, the re-discovery of which long evaded the efforts of archæologists.

The minute study of flint implements has led to the classification of stone-age cultures into a large number of groups and sub-groups. In some cases perhaps this classification may have gone rather in advance of the facts at our disposal, but its broad outlines appear to be definitely established. Of the cultures of the lower Pleistocene our knowledge is immeasurably greater than was the case even ten years ago; and the painstaking researches of Mr. Reid Moir and others in East Anglia have shown that, even before the first (Günz) glaciation, there were at least three well-defined cultural groups among the Englishmen of a million years ago.

At least equal in interest is the section which Dr. Leakey devotes to the skeletal remains of ancient man. He expounds with great clarity the points which distinguish *Homo Sapiens*, or *Neanthropus*, from those other human races, which are collectively known as *Palæoanthropus*. These two great groups Dr. Leakey, with other anthropologists, regards as distinct genera; one of which—*Palæoanthropus*—comprises a number of different species, e. g., Neanderthal, Pekin, Rhodesian. The allocation of these human groups to distinct species seems to signify that they could not interbreed and produce fertile offspring, and is an hypothesis which is naturally incapable of verification since there are no living representatives of them for us to observe. A non-scientific reader might reflect that, if some of the existing races, such as the Mongolian, Negro, and Nordic, were known only from dead specimens, they too, on the ground of their very remarkable physical differences, might be classified as distinct species, whereas we know that they are to be distinguished only as races within a single species. May this not have been the case with ancient groups as it is with modern? Is it not at least permissible to regard humanity, like "La République," as One and Indivisible?

R. A. V. M.

REVIVAL OF BUDDHISM IN JAPAN

[Kanesada Hanazono, M. A., is a Professor at Waseda University, Tokyo, and also an editorial writer for the *Tokyo Nichi-Nichi*, of which he was the correspondent at the Washington Conference in 1922. In 1923 he visited India and strengthened his sympathy for the Indian people. He is a Buddhist by birth and upbringing. He is well known in Japan as the translator of Tagore's works. His contributions on the history of Japanese journalism are highly spoken of.—EDS.]

After half a century of sleep, Japanese Buddhism is now experiencing a re-awakening. This is remarkable in the history of Buddhism in Japan. The initial stimulus which led to it was merely the success of broadcasts on Buddhism this summer. Popular lectures on Buddhism were the summer feature of radio this year, as were physical exercises by radio last summer. The people who earnestly yearn for a spiritual message to ease their worldly sufferings seized on these radio talks. Some publishers on the alert for profit did not let this opportunity slip but published many books of these wireless lectures. Such is the summarized history of the revival of Buddhism in Japan.

Within only three months, at least twenty highly successful books on Buddhism have been published in Japan. Even volumes out of print for many years have been re-issued. Several Grand Old Men are now enjoying a second youth as authors, lecturers or preachers. Meetings are being held for the propagation of Buddhism in different cities. Even newspapers which so far had been "heathen" have now come forward to show their sympathy for this old Japanese faith.

The tendency towards a Buddhist revival, though started by a mere chance, has a great significance. First, the utilization of Buddhism as a defence against the further spread of Marxism. In this sense, Buddhism is the right religion since it is comprehensive as the universe. It may serve to divert men's minds from materialistic views, not by a direct method but by its peculiar characteristic of realignment of values. Buddhism has superb doctrines which may be interpreted as containing Marxian ideas or as opposing them. Therefore, Marxists must come to a halt before Buddhist ideology. Scholars who have frequently failed in opposing Marxism with their own ideas have now given place to Buddhism as guardian of the existing status. This is probably one of the reasons why this revival is being supported by the ruling classes. Some new books on Buddhism contain prefaces by the Ex-Premier who is understood to be rather sympathetic to Christianity.

For the last half a century, Buddhism in Japan has been in some sense an object of popular contempt. Buddhists have in most cases been looked down upon by the man in the street. This is the reverse of

the esteem in which they were held by society in the Tokugawa days. After the revolution in 1868, a strong anti-Buddhist movement started, and some big temples even became Shinto shrines, though but temporarily. Buddhist priests at that time had to learn the doctrines of Shintoism and to qualify as Shinto preachers. The reason why Buddhism came to be slighted was the favour shown to the religion by the Tokugawa family, the governing line before the Imperial Restoration in 1868. All the histories of Japan published for many years after the restoration had no sympathy for Buddhism.

Nobody can deny that Japanese Buddhism was the guiding principle of the civilization of old Japan. There were many great Buddhist monks who opened the roads, cut the mountains, built bridges, established hospitals, wrote priceless books of literature, were advisers to the Government, did much in charity, went to China across the high seas for learning, even fought with arms for the religion. But the new Government was merciless against Buddhism; it adopted the policy of letting Buddhist temples go to ruin, but without success. The revival of Buddhism is a thing which could not have been expected in those days when the influence of revolutionists was so strong.

It must be mentioned that seeds

of materialism were sown by the builders of the new civilization after the Imperial Restoration. Much stress was laid upon the study of science. All the religions, especially Buddhism, were ignored. As the result, many young men became splendid scientists! Japan soon became independent in engineering. There lies the origin of industrialization of Japan. The people had entirely forgotten the religious interest, so that they have now come to receive Buddhism as if they had never known it before. All the lectures on Buddhism are new to most of them. Although Buddhism is a family cult to most Japanese, it has been giving no real inspiration to them.

The perusal of the history of Japan teaches us that in every sixty or seventy years the country experiences a change. The ruling classes are doing their best to avoid any change by force. The people who have lost trust in them now have nowhere to turn for salvation but to the Buddhist faith which they have long forgotten.

This movement is now supported by the rulers of Japan deliberately. Everything which is occurring in Japan must be studied with the consciousness of a coming crisis in 1935, and there can be no reason why it should be otherwise with the revival of Buddhism in Japan in 1934.

KANESADA HANAZONO.

CORRESPONDENCE

REINCARNATION

L. A. G. Strong's "Note Upon Reincarnation" in THE ARYAN PATH for August, 1934, raises an interesting philosophical question as to the validity of certain Theosophical concepts. Time, he points out, is not a part of reality but merely one of the forms or media through which reality makes itself known to us. Such being the case, how—he asks—can the theory of reincarnation, which incorporates time as one of its essential elements, have any claim on ultimate truth.

It is true, of course, that space and time are merely—to use Mr. Strong's terms—the conditions under which we apprehend reality. They are not the true forms of things in themselves but merely our interpretation of them. They are the forms of our particular state of consciousness, and other states of consciousness would see things in some other framework than that of space and time.

Once this is realized there is the tendency, which Mr. Strong has evinced, to feel that any time (or space) phenomena can have no significance beyond our state of consciousness. The thing he overlooks, however, is that space and time as forms of our knowledge apply to everything that we can become cognizant of. The most fundamental of absolute truths can appear to our minds only when clothed in time and space.

The theory of reincarnation, therefore, since it is to be apprehended by our intellects must conform to time and space, but this does not mean that the thing which we know under the concept of reincarnation involves time and space in its real essence. We can never know the thing in itself in our present state of consciousness; what we can know is only its translation into terms of time and space. All our concepts of after-death states are but interpretations of various phases of

the absolute in language that can be understood by our consciousness.

To know what the thing we call reincarnation really is, one has to lead the life taught by Theosophy. By doing so he will ultimately attain to a different state of consciousness, one in which he will be able to discern things without the limitations of time and space. Until such a time, however, space and time will remain as the correct terms of our interpretation—the language in which we can most nearly comprehend reality.

New York

PHILIP CHAPIN JONES.

YOGA AND WESTERN PSYCHOLOGY.

In THE ARYAN PATH of September (p. 595) there appeared a review of Miss Geraldine Coster's *Yoga and Western Psychology* signed "J. P. W." I must say that in a journal which stands for that which is most noble in East and West it caused me considerable surprise, seeing that it was such a brief and unthinking dismissal of a valuable attempt to find a ground for common agreement between the discoveries of certain Western psychologists and the *Yoga Sutras* of Patanjali.

Your reviewer says that Miss Coster has had the presumption to compare what she miscalls "Yoga" with "Western" Psychology, as understood by her. By "Western Psychology," however, she means only the system of psycho-analysis or what she calls "Analytical therapy" associated with the name of Freud, of whom she appears to be an enthusiastic admirer.

But unless I misread the book, I am certain that it is altogether unfair to say that Miss Coster's conception of Western Psychology is *only* the system of psycho-analysis associated with the name of Freud, for she has by no means confined herself to this one school. On the contrary, Miss Coster's idea of Western Psychology is an altogether admirable synthesis of the viewpoints, not only of Freud, but of Jung, Adler and Groddeck.

As to the allegation that Miss Coster has misunderstood the teachings of Yoga, it is surely absurd to make a statement of this kind without even attempting to show how they have been misunderstood. Indeed, I can find absolutely no disagreement between her interpretation of Yoga and the philosophy set forward in the *Bhagavad-Gita* and in many of Mr. Judge's writings. Her explanation of the Yoga attitude to life shows a keen appreciation of Patanjali's teachings. I will quote one passage from her book in support of this statement.

The true adventurer in the world of spirit, the man who has the courage to insist that there is something behind the painted drop-scene, has to learn the invalidity of every form of exterior support, to achieve security by finding a centre of gravity within himself. When this is found he may work for whatever cause he chooses, but he still continues to travel in a forward direction, because he is free in spirit and not obsessed by any one idea.

London

ALAN W. WATTS.

REJOINDER BY THE REVIEWER

Mr. Watts's letter has not altered my views, and I give below a couple of reasons why Miss Coster's book does not commend itself to careful students of Yoga and Occultism.

On pages 77-78 Miss Coster says that the Yoga Sutras of Patanjali do not "inculcate any form of morality as such"; she speaks of "this non-moral attitude of Yoga" as being "wholly consonant with sound psychological practice in the West," and she thinks it erroneous to hold that Yoga "must of necessity involve a standard of morality". This shows a fundamental lack of knowledge of Patanjali.

If Miss Coster had studied the writings of the greatest western Yogini

of modern times, she would have written differently not only about Yoga but also about such movements as Christian Science, New Thought etc., and about "analytical therapy"—the name given by her to the aberration of certain Western "psychologists". In a message to the American Theosophists in 1890, Madame Blavatsky pointed out that there was nothing spiritual or divine about the various healing cults, that the cures effected were due simply to the unconscious exercise of occult powers on the lower planes of nature, and that the conflicting theories of all these were based on misunderstood and misapplied metaphysics.

Again in her invaluable essay *Occultism versus the Occult Arts* (see *Raja-Yoga or Occultism*) H. P. B. compares "the diploma-ed 'Hypnotizers' of the Faculties of Medicine" with the Voodoos and the Dugpas—"the only difference between the two classes being that the Voodoos and Dugpas are conscious, and the Charcot-Richet crew unconscious, Sorcerers." H. P. B. has elaborated these teachings in her writings. Miss Coster, on the other hand, writes appreciatively of Charcot, and more so of Freud who, she points out, followed up and developed the theories of Charcot. Miss Coster has thus put herself out of court with students of true Yoga and true Occultism.

Other points may be mentioned in criticism of Miss Coster's book, but perhaps enough has been said above to show that the review in the September ARYAN PATH was not without justification.

Bombay

J. P. W.

A. R. ORAGE.

We greatly regret to learn of the death of Mr. A. R. Orage, one of our most esteemed contributors, ever very friendly to THE ARYAN PATH and its ideals.—EDS.

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"..... ends of verse
And sayings of philosophers."

HUDIBRAS.

The spirit of tyranny is manifesting itself more and more even among liberty-loving people. In France, as in the U.S.A., the principles of democracy are being disregarded and a regime of autocracy is stealthily coming to the front. In Great Britain the Incitement to Disaffection Bill has made the task of the printers and publishers most difficult. Some important publishers have written to the Press drawing attention to this. They write:—

Publishers are not concerned with politics as such, but they are very much concerned with free expression of opinion, and many of us have felt apprehension... During the past week the proofs of a children's annual have been returned to the publisher with a letter from the printer saying that certain marked passages could not safely be printed in view of the fact that the Incitement to Disaffection Bill would already be law by the time the annual appeared. The passages in question undoubtedly contain anti-war propaganda, which it is not for us either to defend or to criticise; but it is clear that the annual itself is written for children and equally clear that it is not addressed to or intended for circulation among members of his Majesty's forces. Yet we feel sure that, in view of the vague wording of the bill, this incident will not be an isolated one and that the result of the bill, as it stands to-day, will be to impose a severe burden on both printers and publishers.

Mr. H. G. Wells, speaking at the Jubilee Dinner of the Society

of Authors, referred to "a veiled threat of ransacking our books and invading our homes".

At the present time the spirit of encroachment is alive and aggressive. This country may remain immune from the attempt to stifle the distribution of writings. Fundamental changes in the material conditions of human life are going on. If these changes are not to overwhelm us in disaster it is imperative that there should be freedom of criticism.

Next we have a protest issued under the signatures of eighty-five scientific workers and teachers in the University of Cambridge:—

We wish to record a protest against the censorship imposed by the B. B. C. on Professor J. B. S. Haldane's talk in the series "The Causes of War." We consider the B. B. C.'s explanation that they expected him to treat the subject from "the scientific point of view" to be inadequate. Further, we believe that the public should have the right to hear the broadcast opinion of such an eminent man on so vital an issue whether the treatment of the subject conform with the preconceived ideas of the B. B. C., or no.

But while eminent men of science are barred from expressing their frank views, Sir Thomas Inskip, the Attorney General, speaking at a dinner of the Young Britons Movement, attacked what he called the "anti-religious effort which cannot be left to work out its own ends". He blamed the "deliberate attempt" by means of "Communist propaganda to draw

the children away from religion," and called upon his country to deal with it or face disaster. We are no sponsors for the religion of the Communist, which makes him persecute the religion of others; but the record of the Churches during the war, and their numerous moves in these days are ominous. Are the opinions of the Churches sacrosanct or are they sufficiently subservient to conservatism and the *status quo*? Whatever be the reasons, we are confronted with the problem: Does the suppression of opinion viewed unfavourably by authority really effect its purpose, or only tend to drive it underground, to emerge later in a more deadly form? The press and publishers may be restricted by law as to what they say; scientists of the calibre of Mr. J. B. S. Haldane may not be allowed to broadcast—but what will it all effect? The only way to check undesirable propaganda is to put forward desirable propaganda. But what, in the opinion of those in authority, is desirable propaganda? Are we to understand that a vigorous anti-war campaign is not wished for? Then why permit the Churches a free voice? Can it be that those in authority do not regard the pronouncements of the Churches of as great weight as the opinions of the Press? Or can it be they think the organised religious bodies will be amenable to diplomatic compromise?

The Appeal of Aleister Crowley against the judgment of Mr. Justice Swift was dismissed by

three Lords Justices. During its hearing once again the difference between Black and White Magic was spoken of. Lord Justice Greer is thus reported:—

So far as I am concerned, I had never heard of the distinction between black magic and white magic until it was explained by the evidence as a technical distinction which is known to those who study magic and study the arts of people who either are or pretend to be magicians, black or white.

This is one more example of ignorance in high places of subjects vital to human welfare and progress. Magic as a Science is the knowledge of the constitution of Nature and of Man and their intimate relationship, and of the way by which the omnipotence of the human Spirit and its control over nature's forces may be acquired by the individual while still in the body. Magic, as an art, is the application of this knowledge in practice. Arcane knowledge misapplied, is sorcery; beneficently used, true magic or wisdom. The corner-stone of magic is an intimate practical knowledge of magnetism and electricity, their qualities, correlations, and potencies. Especially necessary is a familiarity with their effect in and upon the animal kingdom and man. To sum up: magic is spiritual wisdom; nature, the material ally, pupil and servant of the magician. One common vital principle pervades all things, and this is controllable by the perfected human will. The motive colours the quality of the magic and makes it White or Black.